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This dissertation critically analyses the scholarly literature concerned with the causes, and 
more specifically the religious causes, of the events that occurred in the United States on 
September 11 th 200 L After 19 members of Osama bin Laden's global multinational terrorist 
network, Al Qaeda, were held responsible for committing acts of mass suicide terrorism by 
hijacking 4 planes and crashing 3 of them into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, the 
world questioned whether these 19 men of Middle Eastern origin were representative of all 
Muslims. 
By analysing the strengths and weaknesses of Samuel P. Huntington's <clash of civilisations' 
theory, this dissertation seeks to debunk the myth that there is a clash between Islamic and 
Western civilisations, and that 9/11 was a consequence of this 'clash' a <clash' that is, 
according to Huntington, a direct result of Islam's anti-democratic and inherently violent 
nature. 
The aim of this dissertation is to show that the best probable explanation of the 9111 suicide 
terrorist attacks was the presence of radical Islamic fundamentalism in general and AI Qaeda's 
radical Islamic fundamentalist ideology in particular. Thus, the most probable cause of the 
September 11th attacks was the fact that the 9111 hijackers adhered to radical religious values -
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jahi l~lJ'a (also jahi I~}yah) 
jihad 






IImma (also ummah) 
GLOSSARY 
the living martyr 
derivative of caliph or khal!fa, which means the 
head of the Muslim community, who was 
regarded as the successor of the Prophet 
Muhammad. 
an Islamic decree 
God's sovereignty 
migration 
maidens (of paradise) 
a condition of ignorance, unbelief and barbarism. 
A term originally meant to describe the historical 
period before Muhammad preached in Arabia. 
i.e .. pre-Islamic Arabia. 
to exert or to struggle. Howevec there is a 
distinction between the spiritual and physical 
forms o(iihad 
the Islamic sacred book, the word of God as 
revealed to Muhammad bv the archangel GabrieL . '-
the ninth month of the Muslim year, during 
which strict fasting is observed from sunrise to 
sunset. 
I of the 2 main branches of Islam adhered to by 
the majority of Muslims. and differing from Shi'a 
Islam in its acceptance of the tirst 3 caliphs. 
martyr 
Islamic law 
derivative of sultan, which means a Muslim 
sovereign. 
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1.1 Research Design 
a) Defining the Research Problem 
Soon after receiving the news that a second plane had crashed into the World Trade 
Centre in New York on September 11th 200], U.S. President George W. Bush addressed 
the American nation and told the American people "terrorism will not stand.'" Since 
that tragic and shocking day, President Bush and most Western politicians have taken 
great pains to make it clear that this is "a war against terrorism - not a war against Arabs, 
nor more generally, against Muslims ,,2 However, Osama bin Laden and those that share 
his beliefs claim that this is "a religious war" "a war for Islam against the infidels, and 
therefore, inevitably, against the United States, the greatest power in the world of the 
infidels. co] 
The problem this dissertation confronts is one the world was confronted with in deciding 
who and what caused the September I11h suicide terrorist attacks. First and foremost, 
although Osama bin Laden and his global multinational terrorist network, Al Qaeda, 
were blamed for the attacks, were they really responsible for 911 I? If so, what 
motivated bin Laden and the ] 9 hiiackers to commit the most devastating suicide . ~ 
terrorist attacks the world has ever seen" Who should the world believe bin Laden or 
Bush? If we believe bin Laden then we are agreeing with scholars such as Samuel P 
Huntington, who explain the September 11th attacks as a consequence of long-standing 
cultural, and more specifically religious, differences between the West and Islam. 
However, if we consider the argument Bush purports, as this dissertation does, then we 
Jane Corbin. the Base: AI-Qaeda and the Changing Face o/G/obal Terror (London: Pocket Books. 
2(03). 108. 













are supportive of those authors who dismiss Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' theory 
as being completely flawed, mainly due to the fact that it views Islam as an anti-
democratic and inherently violent monolithic entity one that is incompatible with, and 
intolerant of: Western cultural and religious values. Unlike the argument put forward in 
this dissertation, Huntington's 'clash' thesis does not differentiate between the actions 
perpetrated by the 9111 hijackers, who interpret Islam in a radically militant manner. and 
the rest of the Muslim population, who, regardless of their opposition to U.S. foreign 
policy in the Middle East, do not commit acts of terrorism in the name of their religion. 
b) Research Question 
This dissertation addresses an explanatory question one that seeks to critically analyse 
the religious causes of the 911] suicide terrorist attacks. 
c) The Aim of the Study 
The aim of this dissertation is to show that radical Islamic fundamentalism was the most 
probable cause of the 911] suicide terrorist attacks: debunking the myth that 9111 was 
caused by a 'clash' between Islamic and Western civilisations. 
d) Research Methodology 
In order to achieve the above-specified aim, it is essential that a critical and in-depth 
analysis of reliable scholarly literature concerned with the causes of 9/11 in general, and 
the religious causes of 9111 in particular. is conducted. The type of research carried out 
during the production of this dissertation will thus be based on a critical analysis of the 
intense scholarly debate that has emerged about religious causality, evaluating the 
strengths and weaknesses of the 2 major arguments that have been put forward to 
explain September 11th The first argument is rooted in Huntington's 'clash of 
civilisations theory,' and argues that Islam as a civilisation, and more specifically as a 
religion, is an anti-democratic and inherently violent monolithic entity - one that 
presents a direct threat to the West. The second explanation argues that Islam is not a 
single monolithic entity, that there is marked difference between mainstream traditional 











will demonstrate that Huntington's 'clash' thesis is culturally deterministic and 
exclusive, and that the evidence best supports the second explanation. It is thus not 
, ... & ... , 
Islam, but radical Islamic fundamentalist values that are a threat to the West and all 
those who are willing to compromIse with the values of Western modernity and 
secularism. 
This dissertation therefore aIms to further investigate and develop the cause-effect 
relationship that exists between two variables, radical Islamic fundamentalism, which is 
the independent variable (cause), and the 9/1 1 suicide terrorist attacks, which is the 
dependent variable (effect). Although the research of this dissertation is limited, mainly 
due to the fact that new evidence of the religious causes of 9/11 continues to emerge on 
a daily basis, by critically analysing secondary sources of literature that focus 
specifically on radical Islamic fundamentalism, this dissertation will reveal that the 
independent variable positively correlates with the dependent variable. In other words, 
the more radical an Islamic fundamentalist organisation is, the more likely it is that the 
organisation, e.g., AI Qaeda, as well as its members, will be willing to use terror. In 
order to falsify the hypothesis that radical Islamic fundamentalism was the most 
probable cause of the 9111 suicide terrorist attacks, thus providing the best probable 
explanation of why the events occurred, the research must show that without the 
presence of radical Islamic fundamentalist values, the events of 9111 would not have 
occurred. In other words, if the 9111 hijackers adhered to traditional Islamic values, like 
the majority of Muslims, they would not have committed acts of suicide terrorism, 
which are strictly forbidden in the Koran. 
e) Chapter Outline 
This dissertation will begin, in chapter two, by addressing those questions the whole 
world was asking on September 11th 2001. Firstly, what exactly happened on that 
Tuesday morning and how can the events be defined') Secondly, who was really 
responsible for what has colloquially become known as 9/11, and is there any solid 
evidence to support these claims? Finally, if Osama bin Laden's AI Qaeda terrorist 











hijackers to commit acts of mass suicide terrorism ~ were they, as bin Laden declares, 
motivated by U. S. foreign policy in the Middle East') Chapter two will demonstrate that 
bin Laden exploits the fact that the majority of Muslim people in the Middle East are 
united in their hostility towards u.s. foreign policy. Bin Laden uses this manipulative 
strategy in an attempt to justifY his organisation's terrorist activities, which are clearly 
prohibited in the Koran. 
Chapter three of this dissertation will critically analyse Samuel P. Huntington's 'clash of 
civilisations' theory, which is responsible for perpetuating the Western stereotype that 
views Islam as an anti-democratic and inherently violent monolithic entity ~ one that 
represents a civilisational threat to Western culture. Although Huntington's 'clash' 
thesis is significant in terms of the impact it had on theories of International Relations, 
chapter three will explain why Huntington's thesis does noC contrary to the assumptions 
made by many others soon after the events occurred, apply to 9/11. 
Chapter four will illustrate how radical Islamic fundamentalism, the origins of which lie 
in the Islamic decline, differentiates itself from modernist/moderate Islam. As did the 19 
hijackers, radical Islamic fundamentalists, unlike their modernist/moderate counterparts, 
misinterpret the Koran in a radically militant manner in order to justifY their terrorist 
activities. Thus, the 9111 suicide terrorist attacks were not caused by a 'clash' between 
Islamic and Western civilisations. Rather, they would not have occurred if the 9111 
hijackers were not indoctrinated with AI Qaeda's radical Islamic fundamentalist 
ideology. 
This dissertation therefore concludes, in chapter five, with the concluding findings, 
which are followed by a section that is dedicated to the importance of governments 
knowing exactly where the roots of terror lie ~ knowledge that will enable governments 











The 9111 Suicide Terrorist Attacks: 
Victims, Perpetrators and Political Grievances 
2.1 Introduction 
Besides for the fact that America was attacked on its own soil, with the majority of victims 
being American, many scholars and laypersons believe that the world is not witnessing 
anything new that the US. has perpetrated worse acts against the peoples of the developing 
world. Although there is some truth to this statemenL in an attempt to mobilise support for his 
cause, Osama bin Laden exploits the fact that US. foreign policy is perilously unpopular in 
the Middle East. However, the fact that many Muslims are anti-American is the result of 
genuine political grievances, many of which will analysed in this chapter, and not the 
consequence of believing in a religion that has been stereotyped, by Samuel P. Huntington's 
'clash of civilisations' theory in particular, as being anti-democratic and inherently violent ~ a 
stereotype that bin Laden and the 9111 hijackers seem to accentuate. 
The aim of this chapter is therefore to provide reliable scholarly evidence that 19 men of 
Middle Eastern origin carried out bin Laden's orders by committing acts of mass suicide 
terrorism that resulted in the destruction of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon. This 
task is fundamental in showing that the presence of Al Qaeda's radical Islamic fundamentalist 
ideology, and not Islam as a religion, provides the best probable explanation of the events that 
occurred on September 11 til 2001. However, before one can ascertain what caused 9/! 1, it is 
essential that one know exactly what the perpetrators were responsible for causing. 
2.2 September!! th 
On Tuesday the 11th of September 2001, people around the world were gripped to the 











"preeminent symbols of the United States' military and economic might," had been attacked. 4 
Out of the 4 planes that were hijacked, 2 fully fuelled Boeing 767s collided into the North and 
South Towers of the World Trade Centre, causing explosions that heated the Towers' steel 
structure to 1 500 degrees Celsius "the temperature at which steel melts.":' Many among 
the more than 3 000 confirmed dead became known as 'jumpers." These people made the 
intelligent 'choice' of instant suicide as opposed to "death by burning and suffocation.,,6 
There were 115 nationalities among the rest of those who perished under "the accumulat( ed) 
weight of 110 collapsing floors accelerat(ing) to a speed of 250 miles per hour, causing each 
tower to collapse in about 15 seconds."7 
2.3 9/11: An Act of Suicide Terrorism 
The attacks on the Pentagon and the World Trade Centre had an enormous impact on 
International Relations, with "only few analysts in the developed \vorld" declaring what 
happened unsurprising1' Noam Chomsky, a fierce critic of U S. foreign policy, states that 9/1 ! 
was only shocking due to "the choice of innocent victims. ",) If the same atrocities had 
occurred in a 'third world' country no one in the West would have batted an eye-lid. 
Chomsky points out that "worse disasters" occurred in Central America when "forces armed 
and trained by the US. conducted (themselves) with unspeakable barbarism and brutalitv," . . 
killing some 200 000 people and abandoning over a million people to a life without family, 
tood or shelter. 10 Thus, according to Chomsky, whose opinions are widely reiterated by many 
in the developing world, 9111 was "nothing new."ll 
o Peter L Bergen. [loll' War, Inc. Inside the Secret World o(Osama bin [,aden (London: Phocnix. 2(02). 
227. 
Malisc Ruth,en .. 1 Fut:v/br God: The Islmnist . I flack on America (London: Granta Books. 2002). 5 & 6. 
6 Ruth\cn.:1 & :;. 
Rutll\Cl1. :-; & (l. 
K William T Tow. "Apocalypse Forcvcr? Intcrnational Relations Implications of II September:' in 
.1l/SIralian Journal o(Po/ilics and HistOf:v -+9 (2003): 31-+. 
9. Noam Chomsky. Pirales and Emperors, Old and Yell': Il1fernallUl1a! Terrorism in the Real World 












Chomsky is correct in stating that terrorism is not new. Terrorism in general, and suicide 
terrorism in particular, "are in actuality very old modus operandi.,,12 Throughout the ages, 
people claiming to be "serving a goal or a cause" have used terrorism as a specific type or 
method of warfare. 13 However, although the definition of terrorism is contested, most experts 
agree that terrorist acts should not be defined by the identity of the perpetrators or by the 
nature of their cause. Instead, an act of terrorism should be defined solely by the nature of the 
act H In other words, the focus of any definition of terrorism should be the particular method 
of violence the perpetrators choose in order for them to obtain the leverage, influence and 
power they otherwise lack to effect political change on either a local or international scale."l5 
Terrorists use violence in a shocking way in order to generate publicity for their cause. Acts 
of terrorism are thus "purposefully directed against civilians," with the knowledge that 
unrestrained violence of this nature will provoke an intense media reaction. 16 The attacks on 
t he World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were designed, as all modern acts of terrorism are, 
to generate intense media publicity, the purpose of which is to "instill fear within, and thereby 
. . 'd 'd (I' ,,17 T . . h 'rl . h d fi .. ,,18 ll1tll11! ate, a WI er target alLlence. erronsm IS t us' a _emonstratlve act _y e ImtlOn, 
! 1, Noam Chomsky_ "Who are the Global TerroristsT cll.II in World, 111 Collision: Terror and Ihe FUTure or 
GlohalOrder. eds. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (London: Palgr3\e Macmillan. 2002). 133. 
Yoram Schweitzer. "Suicide Terrorism: De\e[opmcnt and Characteristics" (21 April 2000). A\ailablc 
huo:i I" \\ w, ict-org, illartieles/artieledet cfm?arti~Icid= III accessed on 1.f/08/03. 
1, John Gearsoll. "The Nature of Modern Terrorism'" el1.1 in The TerrorislII Reader. ed, Da\'id l Wittaker 
(London: Routledge. 200 I I. II. 
Gcarsoll. 13. 
I, Da\'id 1. Wittaker. "Definition of Terrorism .. ' ch.l in Ihe Terrori .... ", Reader. ed, Dayid J. Wittaker 
(London: Routledge. 200 I). lO. 
16 Boaz Ganor. "Defining Terrorism: Is One Man's Terrorist Another Man's Freedom FighterT (25 June 
200 I). 7. A \'ailable: http://\Hn,jct.orgjl/artiGlS!s/defillS!~l1tll! accessed on 15/09/03, 
1-. Dayid l Wittaker. "Definition ofTerrorisl11." ch, I in The Terrorism Reader. ed. Dmid l Wittaker 
(London: Routledge. 200 I). 9. 
\~, Ariel Merari. 'The Readiness to Kill and Die: Suicidal Terrorism in the Middle East.·· ell, 10 in Origins ol 
Terrorism: Psychologies. Ideologies, Iheologies, STares o/.\/ll1d. ed, WaIter Reich (Cambridge. UX.: Cambridge 











In other words, the threat or use of shocking and extreme violence is "primarily symbolic" in 
the sense that it is "designed to have psychological repercussions beyond the immediate target 
or victim.,,19 The September 11th attacks can be seen in this light, due to the fact that they 
were deliberately designed to create a profound sense of fear and anxiety within American 
society in particular, and Western society in general. Osama bin Laden, the suspected 
mastermind behind 9111, reveled in the negative psychological effects the attacks had created: 
'There is America, ti.llI of fear from north to south, from west to east. Thank God for that.,,20 
Suicide terrorist attacks, of which the 9/11 attacks constituted a precedent in terms of the 
"scale of effect,,,21 "the scope of participants and the method of operation,,,22 ref1eet "the 
phenomenon of terrorism in its most extreme form. ,,23 The fact that the suicide terrorist, <'who 
actively and purposely causes his own death through blowing himself up along with his 
chosen target" is an anonymous, as well as an unidentifiable threat, makes people paranoid 
and "fearful of venturing beyond their homes even to a convenience store."24 A disguised 
suicide terrorist has "the ability to execute accurate, large-scale attacks,,,25 which due to "the 
relatively high number of casualties guaranteed in such attacks, .. ensures full media 
. John GearsOl1. 'The Nature of Modern Terrorism." in Superlerrorism: Policy Re.sponses. ed. Lawrence 
Freedman (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 2(02). 11 & 12. 
:". Brigelte L. Nacos. --The Terrorist Calculus behind 9-11: A Model for Future Terrorism'J" in Studies in 
Conflict & Terrorism 26 (JanlFeb 2003): 5. 
:;1. John Gearson. "The Nature of Modern Terrorism." in ,','uperlerrorislII: Policy Responses. ed. Lawrence 
Freedman (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 2002). 12. 
:: Yoram Schwcitzer. "Suicide Terrorism and the September II Attacks" (20 October 2002). Available: 
Iltto:!/w\\w.ict.org.illartic]gs/articledet.cfm?m1icleid=.+52 acccssed on 1'+/08/03. 
:3 Yoram Schweitzcr. "Suicide Terrorism: De\clOpmcllt and Characteristics" (21 April 20(0). Available: 
http://'''\,Y.ict.org.il/articleslarticledet.cfm'Jarticleid= 112 accessed 011 1.+/08/03. 
:;\ Bmce Hoffman. "Thc Logic of Suicide Terrorism:' in The . iT/antic .\fonth~t, (June 2003). Available: 
hup://"ww.thcatJantic.com/cgi-bitl.lsend.cgi?pagc=hup%3Nlw\\w.thcatlantic.conl.lissucs ... acccssed on 
II !08!O.i . 
. Council on Foreign Relations. "Suicide Terror: Was 9/11 Something New')"" Available: 










coverage. ,,26 As a result, many experts believe that as in the case of 9111, the need to claim 
credit for such an attack is not a priority. This is due to the fact that "in the minds of the 
terrorists, the act speaks for itself,,27 
2.4 Who Perpetrated the 9/11 Suicide Terrorist Attacks? 
a) Conspiracy Theories 
The fact that no group or person has officially claimed responsibility for the 9111 suicide 
terrorist attacks, thus refusing to explain the motivations for their actions, has given many 
critics of the U.S. the opportunity to conjure up conspiracy theories which enable them to 
. h' Ii h" 28 prOject Leir own agen_a onto Le sItuatIOn. 
One of the most popular conspiracy theories accuses the United States of attacking its own 
citizens in order to generate some sort of provocation or pretext. "The fact that US 
intelligence services had been alerted by the French, by the Israelis, by the Philipinos - that 
an attack was planned, but nonetheless did nothing to prevent it is treated as proof that the 
S. intelligence services, and by extension, the C.S. leadership in general, were somehow 
complirit, banking on the political benefits that would accme. ,,29 By placing the blame on 
Osama bin Laden and 19 men of Middle Eastern origin, 15 of whom came from Saudi Arabia, 
many in the Muslim world believe that 9/l1 was an American/Jewish conspiracy a 
conspiracy designed by the Judeo-Christian alliance to destroy the lands of Islam. In many 
Middle Eastern countries Osama bin Laden is celebrated as a defiant hero a devout Muslim 
who remains defiant in the face of false accusations]O 
--.~--------
:('. Yoram Sclmciucr. "Suicidc Tcrrorism: De\clopmctlt and Charactcristics" (21 April 20(0). Available: 
http://www.ict.orgjUarticlcs/articiedet.cfm·'articleid= 112 accessed on 1.+/08/03. 
:-. John Gcarson. "The Naturc of Modern Terrorism." in Superlerrorism: Policy Responses. ed. Lawrence 
freedman (Oxford: Blackwcll Publishing. 20(2). II. 
2~ Russell A Bcnnan. "September II." in Telos 120 (Summer 200 I): 163 & 16'+. 
29 Bcrman. 16'+. 
'''. Joseph Lely,cld "All Suicide Bombers Are Not .Alikc" (28 October 2(01). Ayailable: 











b) Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 Hijackers 
i) The 9/11 Hijackers and their Readiness to Kill and Die 
Although "nine months after 9111 ... the FBI reported that it still had only suspicions about the 
origins and planning of the 9111 attacks," most of the reliable evidence collected during "what 
must be the most extraordinary international investigations in history," 31 reveals that FB I 
suspicions were correct: 19 men, "15 of (whom) came from Saudi Arabia, 2 from the United 
Arab Emirates, I from Syria/Lebanon and 1 from Egypt" all of whom have been directly 
linked to Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda terrorist organization, committed an act of suicide 
terrorism which resulted in their own deaths, as well as the murder of over three thousand 
people32 
On September 11th 2001, Mohamed Atta (pilot). Abdulaziz al-Omari, Satam al-Suqami, Wail 
al-Shehri and Waleed al-Shehri hijacked American Airlines Flight 11 and flew it into the 
North Tower of New York's World Trade Centre at 8:45 a.m., purposely killing themselves 
and everyone on board the plane. On that same morning, at 9:03 a.ill., Marwan al-Shehhi 
(pilot), Ahmed al-Ghamdi, Fayez Benihamed, Hamza al-Ghamdi and Mohand al-Shehri 
crashed United Airlines Flight 175 into the South Tower of the World Trade Centre 
intentionally killing themselves and everyone on board. American Airlines Flight 77 smashed 
into the South-West face of the Pentagon in Wahington D.C. at 9:43 a.m. Hani Hanjour 
(pilot), Khalid al-Midhar, Majed Moqed, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Salem al-Hazmi are the 
suspected hijackers of Flight 77. Ziad Jarrah (pilot), Ahmed al-Haznawi, Ahmed al-Haznawi 
and Said al-Ghamdi hijacked United Airlines Flight 93 33 - their intended target was suspected 
of being the White House. 3~ However, during flight some of the "passengers began receiving 
il. Noam Chomsky. Pirates and r"-mperors. Old and .Yell'.· international Terrorism in the Real World 
(London Pluto Prcss. 20(2). 1. 
'c. Ste\e Smith. "Unanswcrcd Qucstions.-· ch.-l in Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future (~rG/ohal 
Order. eds. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (New York: Palgrayc Macmillan. 2(02). -l9 & 51. 
". Jane Corbin. Ihe Base: .U-Qaeda and the Changing Face of Global Terror (London: Pocket Books. 2003) . 
.\i\. :\,' & N3 . 












mobile-phone calls from their relatives and friends alerting them to the seizure and crashing of 
the earlier flights,,35 Jeremy Glick, a passenger on board Flight 93, called his wife and told 
her that "Middle Eastern-looking men wearing red bandannas round their heads" had hijacked 
the plane he was on. Glick, "a former judo champion," as well as fellow passenger Tom 
Burnett, informed their wives that the passengers were thinking of "rushing the hijackers. ,,36 
At 10:03 a.In. Flight 93 crashed in a Held South-East of Pittsburgh there were no survivors37 
In the wreckage of Flight 93, a 5 page handwritten document was discovered. Other copies, 
also written in Arabic, were found in a car belonging to the hijackers at Dulles airport, as well 
as in a bag owned by Mohamed Atta. 3 l<: An analysis of the document, which is believed to 
have been written by Atta, the 33 year old Egyptian leader of the group, reveals that it was 
written speciHcally for the 9111 hijackers, with the particular intention of guiding them 
through their suicide mission. 39 The "Doomsday Document" which will be discussed further 
in chapter four, has been analysed in depth by Juan Cole, a scholar of Middle Eastern history 
who is fluent in Urdu, Farsi and Arabic. Cole's conclusion was that the document was a 
sophisticated method of indoctrination.40 The first part of the document, entitled "The Last 
Night," "contains ] 5 instructions aimed at preparing the hijackers psychologically for their 
action on the night before they were to carry it out,,41 The first instruction directs the soon to 
be hijackers to "vow to accept death," urging them to prepare for their "rendezvous with 
Eternal Truth" by performing endless hours of ritualistic acts. Instruction 7 emphasises the 
v; Jane Corbin. the Ba."e: .ll-Qaeda and the Chan,fling j;ace (~lCTlohaI7error (London: Pocket Books. 20(3). 
III 
~(\ Corbin. Ill. 
r Corbin. 112. 
'> Xmier Raufer. ··AI Qaeda: A Different Diagnosis." in ,')"tudies in Conflicf & Terrorism 26 (2003): 397 . 
. w Janc Corbin. The Basc: .·If-Qaeda and the Changing Face of(Tlobal Terror (London: Pocket Books. 200:n. 
217. 
1" The Christian Science Monitor. ·'Reading into the Mind of a Terroris'" (30 Octoocr 2003). Ayailablc: 
http://,, W\\. c.smonitor com1200 3/1 030/p I I sO l-lcgn. html accessed on 1/12/03 . 
.11. Juan Cole. ··AI-QJcda·s Doomsday Documcnt and Psychological Manipulation'" prescntcd at Genocide 
and Terrorism: Probing [he .\lind of/he Perpetrator (New HaYen: Yale Centre for Genocide Studies. 9 April 











importance of forgetting and being completely "oblivious to that thing called the world," 
encouragmg a state of "liminal consciousness" necessary for committing mass suicide and 
.p murder. • 
Also found in Mohamed Atta' s luggage was a copy of his wilL which was written on the 11111 
of April 1996. Atta's will is comprised of "strict instructions" indicating the way in which his 
body should be handled after his death 43 Atta repeatedly insists that he "died as a Muslim 
which is God's religion." All 18 instructions emphasise Atta's religious devotion and demand 
that everyone who attends his funeral must be "good Muslims," warning "people will be held 
responsible for not following the Muslim religion,,44 Instmction 14 states, "Everyone who 
attends my funeral should ask that I will be forgiven for what I have done in the past (not this 
action)." The words, "not this action," indicate that Atta was planning to die a martyr 
(shahiel) defending Islam against nonbelievers - an action deserving only of praise. 4S 
According to the Koran, "to die for one's faith is the highest form of witness to God: "If you 
are killed in the cause of God or you die, the forgiveness and mercy of God are better than all 
that you amass. And if you die or are killed, even so it is to God that you will return (3: 157-
158) ,,4(, 
However. although "being killed by the enemy in jihad guarantees paradise, suicide is strictly 
forbidden. Shahid is the warrior who was killed by the enemy in battle. not the one who killed 
himself.,,47 Bernard Lewis, a seminal author on Islamic history and culture, states that the 
·1: Cole. 11-l3 
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early Islamic authorities "make a clear distinction between facing certain death at the hands of 
the enemy and dying by one's own hand.,,48 Islamic law conforms with Christianity and 
Judaism by condemning all those who commit suicide to eternal hell. 49 Islam is particularly 
strict with regards to the punishment suicides will suffer. The following passage from the 
traditions of the Prophet Muhammad is testament to this fact: "Whoever kills himself in any 
way will be tormented in that way in Hell ... Whoever kills himself in any way in this world 
will be tormented with it on the day of resurrection. ,,50 
Although there is much dispute as to whether all of the 19 hijackers knew they were going to 
die on the morning of September 11th , Osama bin Laden himself is quoted in lhe Washington 
Post as saying that although the details of the hijackings were not known until just before the 
men boarded the planes, they all knew in advance that it was a "martyrdom operation."sl 
There is still much confusion, however, about how much time the hijackers were given to 
comprehend their impending deaths, many believe that the "Doomsday Document" was 
tantamount in stiffening the hijackers' resolve. 52 It is known for sure, however, that at least 6 
of the men had received flying lessons up to two years prior to September 11 th. These men, 
Mohamad Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, Ziad Jarrah, Khalid al-Midhar, Nawaf al-Hazmi and Hani 
Hanjour had been preparing for their martyrdom mission for at least two years in advance and 
knew that it would involve a suicide flight mission. 53 Ziad Jarrah, who often stayed at 
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Mohamed Atta's rented apartment in Hamburg with Marwan al-Shehhi, wrote a farewell note 
to his girlfriend telling her that she will "have to wait a bit longer until (they) can be together 
again." In the letter he says that he "did not escape," but has done what he had to do. He tells 
her that she should be proud of him, "for this is an honour. ,,54 One can deduce from the 
wording of his farewell letter that Jarrah had planned in advance to commit suicide. More 
importantly, however, he did not believe that this action would lead to severe punishment in 
the afterlife. Contrary to Islamic tradition, he believed that his suicide would be a honourable 
death in defense of Islam, one that according to the 'Doomsday Document' would be 
rewarded with the sexual pleasures of heavenly "houris or maidens."s5 
ii) Osama Bin Laden: The Mastermind behind September 11 th 
On the 16th of April 2002, the Arabic television network, Al Jazeera, aired a videotape of 
Ahmed al-Haznawl (one of the Saudi hijackers aboard Flight 93) pledging his life to 
"martyrdom" and declaring that he would "send a 'bloodied message' to the Americans by 
attacking them in their 'heartland. ",56 ~Al-Haznawi's message, which was recorded 6 months 
before 9/11, contradicts the evidence that only the 6 men who had received flying lessons were 
aware that September 11th was a suicide mission. Al-Haznawi's message is, however, the first 
evidence "not produced by the U.S. government to tie the accused terror mastermind (Osama 
bin Laden) to the Sept 11 attacks."s7 Hafez El-\1irazi, Al lazeera's Washington bureau chiet: 
stated that the videotape, which "features bin Laden, top AI Qaeda deputy Ayman "Al-Zawahiri 
and a man identified as one of the Sept. 11 hijackers (al-Haznawi)," "is the first clear 
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evidence" from a non-U.S. source "that bin Laden and AI Qaeda are responsible for Sept. 
The videotape, which is entitled "The Wills of the New York and Washington Battle Martyrs," 
shows "pictures of all 19 hijackers."s') Ayman AI-Zawahiri, who is pictured sitting next to 
Osama bin Laden, says "those brothers who went out and gave their souls to Allah almighty, 
God almighty has granted them this victory we are enjoying now ,,60 Although "bin Laden 
does not speak" on the tape, Ayman AI-Zawahiri assumedly speaks on his behalf when he says 
"we thank God for the victory we have achieved. This victory can only be attributed to the 
goodness of God.,,61 According to AI Jazeera network officials, the segments featuring bin 
Laden and his deputy were made after September, whilst those of al-Haznawi were made "in 
the Afghan city of Kandahar about six months before September 11." Al-Haznawi's final will 
and testament is screened against a background "picture of the World Trade Centre twin 
towers exploding.,,62 The "image of the World Trade Centre in flames was apparently 
electronically inserted into the tape of Ahmed al-Haznawi.,,63 
Al-Haznawi begins his "prepared statement" by saying that he was going to "help send a 
'bloodied message' to the world.,,64 The hijacker "provides no details of the plot" (probably 
because - as has been mentioned above - he was not informed of the details until just before 
the 19 accused men boarded the planes). He does, however, implicate himself in the 9111 
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attacks by angrily declaring, "it is time to kill the Americans on their own ground among their 
families and soldiers ... The truth is that we will fight them on their own ground." Al-Haznawi 
"boasts of having killed Americans outside their homeland, an apparent reference to Al Qaeda 
attacks on U.S. targets overseas.,,65 He then VO'."IS to take revenge for "the time of bondage 
and humiliation" that Muslims have suifered,bb and warns all Americans to "start digging their 
own graves because a thousand bin Ladens are preparing to kin them ,,67 AI-Haznawi thus 
directly implicates bin Laden in the 9111 attacks by implying that bin Laden has been the 
inspiration for any future attacks on American soil. Ihe ~MlIs/im News reported that the 
videotape "erases any doubt that Osama bin Laden was behind the atrocities.,,68 
'The Wills of the New York and Washington Battle Martyrs' is not, however, the first time 
that Osama bin Laden lauded the 9111 plot. In mid-November 200!' videotape was recovered 
from Afghanistan in which bin Laden is seen sharing his delight with a visiting Saudi Arabian 
Sheikh. Some analysts are of the opinion that this videotape is merely indicative of bin 
Laden's reaction to the September 11th attacks. However, many more believe that this 
videotape is hard evidence that Osama bin Laden was a key figure, if not, the key figure, in the 
planning of the 91] 1 attacks69 The following excerpts dearly indicate that the attacks did far 
more damage than bin Laden had personally anticipated. 7iJ Bin Laden states that he had 
"calculated in advance" the damage the exploding planes would cause to the World Trade 
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Centre. Furthermore. the subsequent quotations reveal that bin Laden had prior notification of 
the specific date "the event would take place: ,,71 
()sama hin Iaden: "We calculated in advance the number of casualties from the enemy 
who would be killed, based on the position of the tower. We calculated that the floors that 
would be hit would be three or four floors. I was the most optimistic of them all ... due to 
my experience in this field, I was thinking that the fire from the gas in the plane would 
melt the iron structure of the building and collapse the area where the plane hit and all the 
floors above it only. ll1is is all that we had hoped for." 
."lheikh: "Allah be praised." 
()sama Bin Iaden: "We were at [inaudible] when the event took place. We had 
notification since the previous 111Ursday that the event would take place that day. We had 
finished our work that day and had the radio on. It was 5:30 P.M. our time. I was sitting 
with Dr. Ahmad Abu-al-Khair. Immediately we heard the news that a plane had hit the 
World Trade Centre. We turned the radio station to the news from Washington. The 
news continued (lnd no mention of the (ltt(lck until the end. At the end of the newscast 
they reported that a plane just hit the World Trade Centre." 
.\neikh· "Allah be praised ,,72 
2.5 U.S. Foreil!n Policv in thel\:fiddle East: A Cause of 9/11? . - . - 0 - -", - -.. . - - . - . 
a) A Declaration of War by Osama bin Laden: The 1998 Fahva 
On February 23, 1998, Osama bin Laden declared a 'holy war' on the United States of 
America. Bin Laden. together with the leaders of the 'World Islamic Front tor Jihad against 
the Jews and the Crusaders.' called on "everv Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be . . 
rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and plunder their money wherever 
I Rohan Gunaratna. Inside AI Qaeda. Global Yenl'Ork o{Terror INc" York: The Bcrkley Publishing Group. 
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terrorist attacks were "a strike delivered in accord,,74 with this 1998 }ClIwa. 75 Thus. in order to 
attempt an answer to the question of why bin Laden masterminded the 9/11 attacks. it is 
necessary that one refrain "from caricature and instead attend to bin Laden's own statements 
about 'Nhy he is at war with the United States. ,,76 "Osama's f!lf1m gave three main reasons 
why (Muslims) should target the United States:"n 
"First. for seven years the United States has been occupying the lands of Islam :in the 
holiest of places, the Arabian Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its miers, 
humiliating its people, terrorizing its neighbours, and turning its bases in the peninsula 
into a spearhead through which to fight the neighbouring Muslim peoples. If some people 
in the past have argued about the fact that the occupation, all the people of the peninsula 
have now acknowledged it. The best proof of this is America's continuing aggression 
against Iraqi people using the peninsula as a staging pose even though all its mJers are 
against their territories being used to that end. but they are helpless." 
"Second, despite the great devastation inflicted on the Iraqi people by the Crusader-
Zionist alliance, and despite the huge number of those killed, which has exceeded one 
million ... despite all this, the Americans are once again trying to repeat the horrific 
massacres, as though they are not content with the protracted blockade imposed after the 
Gilnaratna I 
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ferocious war or the fragmentation or devastation. So here they come to annihilate what is 
left of this people and to humiliate their Muslim neighbours." 
"Third. if the Americans' aims behind these wars are religious and economic. the aim is 
also to serve the Jews' petty state and divert attention from its occupation of Jerusalem 
and murder of Muslims there. The best proof of this is their eagerness to destroy Iraq. the 
strongest neighbouring Arab state, and their endeavor to fragment all the states of the 
region such as Iraq, Saudi Arabia. Egypt, and Sudan into paper statelets and through their 
disunion and weakness to guarantee Israel's survival and the continuation of the brutal 
rd' f ] . 1,,78 
l. rusae occupatIon 0 t le pemnS\I a 
19 
According to Osama bin Laden. "these crimes ... amount to 'a clear declaration of war by the 
Americans against God, his Prophet, and the Muslims. '" In such a situation it is incumbent on 
every individual Muslim to defend the lands of islam by killing "Americans and their allies. 
both civil and military ... in any country where this is Dossible,,79 
.. ..... j. 
i) U.S. Troops in Saudi Arabia 
Five and a half months after bin I ~aden issued this declaration, the Saudi born multimillionaire 
was "held responsible for .. the bombing of the American embassies in Nairobi and Dar es 
Salaam." Shortly after the simultaneous bombings. Osama bin Laden was declared 
"Washington's most wanted fbgitive" and \vas charged with conspiring to kill Arnericans
gO 
The fact that the date of the two U. S. bombings in East Africa coincided with "the eight 
anniversary of the arrival of American troops in Saudi Arabia in 1990" is evidence that the 
u.s. presence in Saudi Arabia was. and remains, bin Laden's "primary concern."S! 
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Osama bin Laden's dissent of the Saudi regIme began in June 1990 when Iraq invaded 
Kuwait. King Fahad7 the Custodian of the Two Holy Places7 rejected bin Laden's offer to 
provide the services of his Arab-Afghan veterans. all of whom had at some stage been resident 
at one of Osama's militant training camps in Afghanistan 82 Instead of accepting bin Laden' 5 
offer to organise a defense of the Saudi Kingdom, King Fahad invited 540 000 American U.S. 
troops to protect the Holy Land. The fact that "20 000 U. S. troops continued to be based in 
Saudi Arabia atter Kuwait's liberation,,,S3 infuriated bin Laden to such an extent that the Saudi 
regime felt it necessary to strip him of his citizenship in April 1994.l\'\ 
In August 1996, Osama bin Laden issued "A Declaration of War Against the Americans 
Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places: A Message trom Osama bin Muhammed bin 
Laden unto his Muslim Brethren All over the World Generallv. and Toward the Muslims of 
the Arabian Peninsula in Particu!ar.,,85 Bin Laden's ! 996 fatl!'a, 'which was not formally 
sanctioned by a legitimate religious authority, lib describes the occupation of the Land of the 
Two Holy Places as the greatest suffering ever inflicted upon the world's Muslims by the 
. ~(7 mfide! enerny. . 
The fact that the Saudi regime allowed the Americans to occupy the holiest land in all of Islam 
is unforgivable when one considers the Prophet Muhammad's final utterance: "Let there be no 
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"the U.S, and more generally Western presence in Saudi Arabia ... desecrate the sanctity of 
the sacred land.,,89 Many scholars of Middle Eastern and Islamic studies have, however, 
pointed out that although "Caliph Umar decreed that Jews and Christians should be removed 
from Arabia ... his decree 'Has both limited and compassionate ,,90 In contrast to moderate 
Islam. which is tolerant and believes in the "restoration of equality among the People of the 
Book," Osama bin Laden threatens and uses indiscriminate violence against non-believers, 
whom he judges according to an exclusivist ideology. The Prophet Muhammad himself. 
warned "against innovation in religion," as well as "all damaging political innovations" which 
sought to "(capture) power over Muslims" by claiming the right to label "their opponents as 
non-believers, ,,91 
Contrary to Islamic tradition, Osama bin Laden uses his 1996/afH'a to condemn the Saudi 
regime as un-Islamic. According to bin Laden. in addition to the regime's inability to protect 
the country from the American crusader forces, the Saudi Kingdom "has torn off its 
legitimacy" by "ignoring the divine .)'hariah law.,,92 Bin Laden repeatedly states that the 
regime's implementation of man-made civil law has stripped the Kingdom of its Islamic 
status, thus giving the Muslims of the Arabian Peninsula no choice but to overthrow the Saudi 
regime and replace it with "a tme Islamic state.,,93 
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ii) U.S. Support for Repressive Regimes 
In April 1982. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat was assassinated. The men charged with 
plotting and instigating the assassination explained that it Vias their duty to exterminate leaders 
who had abandoned God's faith and replace them '.vith the "perfect Islamic order." 94 Egypt's 
current President. Hosni Mubarak. has also been condemned by senior Al Qaeda leaders as 
"godless" and anti-Islamic ,,95 In recent years. !1mvever. moderate Islamic Eh"!ptians have 
rocked the streets of Cairo with calls for Mubarak's resignation a demand that was brutally 
suppressed. Much like Sadat's regime, Mubarak's government is characterised by its 
authoritarianism and corruption. Many Muslims living in Egypt are infuriated by the fact that 
the United States - a country that stands for freedom and democracy is "content to let 
!v1ubarak reign supreme and indefinitely" 96 
In exchange for U.S. support, Egypt was transformed into one of Washington's most 
important strategic partners in the Middle East. For example. Mubarak. "more than anyone 
else, gave legitimacy to the U.S.-led coalition in the Gulf War. He not only moved quickly to 
persuade several Arab states to join the coalition following Iraq's 1990 invasion of Kuwait 
but also dispatched 36 000 soldiers to the battlefield and provided the United States with over 
flight and basing rights.,,97 In return for his efforts, Mubarak's regime was rewarded with 
more foreign aid "than any other country in the world except Israel." Most Egyptians. 
however. have not benefited from "the billions of dollars in aid the country receives each 
year.,,98 As a result, Egypt's people are growing increasingly resentfi .. !l and disillusioned 
towards their tyrannical President and the Superpower that supports him. 'J'J 
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Dictatorships such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia allow "individuals no room for legitimate 
pa!itical activity."IOO "Lacking any ather outlet, new and growing discontents ... find 
expression in religious extremist movements. ,,11)\ Radical Islamic organisations, such as 
Ayman AI-Zawahiri's Egyptian Islamic Jihad and Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda. offer an 
"attractive alternative" to many of those who feel that "there has to be something betteL trueL 
and more hopefi.ll than the inept tyrannies of their rulers.,,102 In order to mobilise support, 
radical Islamic groups provide discontented Muslims with "a critique of what is wrong and a 
f. ,.. h ,,103 Th ' , f h ' h M I' Id T program ,or puttmg It rIg .t. . ,.e CrItique 0 w at went wrong m t. e c us 1m wor. 'IS not 
entirely wrong" in blaming the West for present-day conflicts in the Middle East. 104 However, 
feelings of humiliation and despaiL anger and frustration, are effectively exploited by Islamic 
extremist groups that justifY their hatred of the United States by enforcing their "own 
understanding ofIslam.,,105 
iii) Iraq and Palestine 
In order to garner aggressive Muslim support. Osama bin Laden cunningly exploits politically 
contested issues such as the United Nations' economic sanctions against Iraq and the United 
States' support for Israel with regards to the IsraelilPalestinian conflict. The U. N. sanctions 
against Iraq are one of the grievances mentioned most frequently by the leader of Al Qaeda.106 
Bin Laden's 1998 declaration of war lists 3 main grievances bin Laden has against the United 
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\'; d 11' , , J07 1 ' "h h ' . , _tates an a .. lts CItIzens, .t IS surpnsmg Lat a man w .. o was once willIng to defend Saudi 
Arabia against Saddam Hussein's apostate regime. lUll is now deeply concerned about the 
effects of "the protracted blockade imposed after the ferocious war" a war he was eager to 
f h 109.~ d' b' L d "h A. ' , " "1' 1 " .!g .. t. .~ccor Ing to In a en, t e .'"'L.rnencans contInUIng aggressIon agaInst .raq! peop.e 
has resulted in the deaths of over "one million" children. j 10 Although few deny the 
destruction the U.N. sanctions have caused. the perception that the United States "the leading 
advocate of maintaining the U.N. sanctions" - is entirely responsible for the suffering of the 
Iraqi people is "a wellspring of anti-Americanism in the Middle East"]]] 
Similarly. the issue of Palestine, or rather America's support for Israel with regards to the 
Israeli/Palestinian conflict, is a grievance Osama bin Laden has exploited as "the perfect 
vehicle for his propaganda,,112 The fact that "bin Laden's statements before September 11 
placed anti-Israel themes relatively low on his litany of grievances," indicates that "U.S. 
support for Israel" was "probably not" a cause of 9/11.113 Bin Laden, did, however, start 
"invoking the Palestinian cause more frequently after September 11 to rally Arab support." 
For example, in videotape found after 911 L bin Laden specifically refers to the innocent 
Palestinian children being killed as a result of America's apathy.I]-t The fact that "many - if 
not most - Arabs cite American backing for the Jewish state as one of their main complaints 
I'" Rohan Gunaratna.Inside AI Qaeda: Glohal c\'enmrk of Terror (New York: The Berklcy Puhlishing 
Group, 20(2). 5X & 59. 
li~. Gillcs KepcL Jihad' the Trial (~f Political Islalll (U. S.A' The Belknap Press of Hanard UniYcrsity Press. 
2(1)2), 316. 
]"9 Rohan GWlaratna, Inside AI Qaeda: Glohal Yell1'ork ufTerror (New York: The Berkley Publishing 
Group. 2002), 59. 
!" Gnn:mllna. 59 
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i1lln://mnuerrorismanswers.com/causesiiraa.html accessed on 0 lIl2/OJ. 
112 Michael Scott Doran, "Palestine. Iraq, and American Strategy" in Foreign .{(fai rs 82 (Jan/Feb 2003): 25. 
1;3 Council on Foreign Relations. ~~Causes of 9/] I' l1.S_ Support for IsracL~· AyaHahlc: 
hup:/l\nnY.terrorismanswers.com/causes/israelsuPlXlrt.html accessed on 01112/03. 











against the United States,,,ll5 enabled bin Laden to spin the 911! attacks "as retribution for 
crimes committed against Palestine."lI6 However. many scholars have pointed out that 
"Palestine-as-symbo! works best when Pa!estine-as--place is burning.,,117 In other words. 
Osama bin Laden relies on the escalation of the Israe\iIPalestinian contlict in order to rally 
support against the United States. The universal symbolism of Palestine, ie, "the fact that 
(Palestine) represents all grievances in the Middle East against the West," thus only serves to 
benefit bin laden and his campaign of terraL I 18 
2.6 Conclusion 
Although Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda terrorist network have been held responsible for 
causing the most shocking and extreme act of suicide terrorism the world has ever seen, no 
one, including bin Laden, has officially claimed responsibility. This, among other things, has 
led to competing and contradictory interpretations of whom and what caused 9/11. Recent 
videotaped evidence does, however. come close to a full admission by senior AI Qaeda leaders 
that the 19 men suspected by the FBI, were in fact guilty of perpetrating the 9111 suicide 
terrorist attacks. Whether all 19 men knew they were going to die is a matter that has been 
hotly contested. It is widely agreed, however, that at least 6 of the men knew they were going 
to die that Tuesday morning. Although suicide is strongly condemned in Islamic tradition, 
leaders of radical Islamic organisations indoctrinate their recruits to believe that there is no 
greater honour than becoming a martyr and defending Islam against infidels and apostates. 
On September 11th 2001, Osama bin Laden hoped to rally support against the West and its 
Middle Eastern allies by showing Muslims that America is not invincible and that it's citizens 
are not exempt from terror and fear. In his 1998 laMa, bin Laden exploits popular political 
grievances in the Middle East. such as U. S. troops in Saudi Arabia, U. S. support for repressive 
regimes. the United Nation's economic sanctions on Iraq and U.S support for Israel with 
j 15 Council on Foreign Relations. 
II" Michael Scott Doran "Palestine. fraq. and American Strategy .. ' in Foreign.-ljfairs 82 (JanJFeb 20(3): 25. 
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regards to the Israeli Palestinian conflict. in order to create a mood of hatred and revenge. 
However, mobilisation of aggressive Muslim support requires leaders of radical Islamic 
groups to use religious and ideological rhetoric as justification for their acts of terror. In other 
words, in order to legitimate using acts of terroL radical Muslims such as bin Laden and the 
9111 hijackers justifY terrorism in generaL and suicide terrorism in particular, with their own 
militant interpretation of the Koran. Radical Islam is thus based on a misinterpretation of the 
Koran. which contrary to Islamic ethics of religious pluralism. advocates and seeks to provoke 












9/11: A 4Clash of Civilisations'/Islam versus the West? 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the events of 9/11 Samuel P. Huntington's ideas have received renewed emphasis, with 
scholars and laypersons alike questioning whether civilisations, and more specifically Islam 
and the West, are at war. The aim of this chapter is to show that the 'clash of civilisations' 
theory proposed by Huntington in 1993 and elaborated upon in is his 1996 book, is not, as he 
and many others believe, the most "meaningful and useful lens" through which to view 
International Relations in the post-Cold War world lI9 Despite the fact that Huntington's ideas 
are superficially alluring, a critical analysis of his central claims regarding the differences 
between Islamic and Western cultural values reveals additional weaknesses in his theory, 
which when applied to 9111 debunk the myth that there is a clash between Western and 
I slamic civilisations. 
3.2 Huntington's 'Clash of Civilisations' Theory 
a) "'The Remaking of World Order": Inter-Civilisational Conflict 
Several months after AI Qaeda first attempted to blow up the World Trade Centre, the journal 
Foreign "~ffairs published Samuel P. Huntington's article, "The Clash of Civilizations"" 
Huntington's now-famous article was written to oppose Francis F ukuyama 's 'one world" 
theory of post-Cold War world politics. 
Unlike Fukuyama, who in his 1989 article "argued that we had reached 'the end of history': 
not that historical events would stop, but that History, understood as the evolution of human 
societies through different forms of government, had culminated in modern liberal democracy 
119 Samuel P Huntington. lhe Clash a/Civilizations and the Rel/lakil1R of World Order (London: Simon & 











and market orientated capitalism,,,12o Huntington argues that "the disintegration of the cold 
war system," i.e., "a stable bipolar (two superpowers) system," allowed for "a new balance of 
power,,]21 one that is, "for the first time in history, .. multipolar and multicivilizational.d22 
According to Huntington, "the remaking of world order" resulted in a change of nation-state - '- ~ "'-- '-
behaviour. The behaviour of nation states, which "remain the principal actors in world 
atfairs," is greatly intluenced by the "cultural preferences, commonalities, and differences" of 
the world's civilisations123 In other words, "culture is meaningful in the international 
system to the extent that it has an impact on behaviour, and in particular in the way that it 
embodies and defines diiference.,,12..J 
According to Huntington, world politics has entered a new phase, one in which "the next 
pattern of conflict ... will not primarily be ideological or primarily economic (as it was during 
P" the Cold War)" -. 
"The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be 
cultural. Nation-states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the 
principle conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different 
civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines 
between civilizations will be the battle lines oft.he future ,,126 
i :". Francis Fukuyama. "History and Seplember It." ch.2 in !rorld\' in ColliSIOn: Terror and the Future of' 
G/oha/ Order. cds. Kcn Booth and Tim Dunne (London: Palgrayc Macmillan. 2002). 27 & 28. 
i21. Timothy Dunne. "Realism." ch.6 in The G/ohaliZaliOI1 o,rWorld Politics:.-In introduction to international 
Relallons. cds. John Baylis and Ste\e Smith (New York: Oxford Unhersity Press. 1997). 119. 
I::, Samuel P. Huntington. Ihe Clash o/CiviliZalions and The Remaking of' World Order (London: Simon & 
Schuster. 1996). 21. 
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Thus, according to Huntington, "conflict between civilizations will be the latest phase in the 
evolution of conflict in the modem world,,\27 Huntington defines a civilisation as "the highest 
cultural grouping and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which 
distinguishes them from other species."J28 The post-Cold War world order will be dominated 
by the interactions among 7 or 8 major civilisations, which according to Huntington are as 
follows: "Western, Confusion, Japanese, Islamic, Hindu, Slavic-Orthodox, Latin American 
and possibly African.,,129 The identity of different civilisations is determined by key cultural 
elements such as language, history, customs, traditions, institutions and, most importantly, 
religion. These cultural differences are basic to our civilisation identity. In other words, they 
are the elements that define a civilisation's values and norms130 For example, "people of 
different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the 
individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as 
well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibilities, liberty and 
authority, equality and hierarchy."l3l Huntington, like many distinguished historians, holds 
the opinion that "these differences are the product of centuries" and thus "will not soon 
disappear,,132 Huntington's theory predicts that conflicts in the new world order will occur as 
a result of these long-standing historical "differences among civilizations." 131 
Huntington's civilisational paradigm assumes that one of the effects of globalisation is that the 
interactions between peoples belonging to different cultural entities are increasing. 
Consequentially, Huntinf,rton believes that "differences and animosities stretching back deep 
1 ,- Hunting1on. 22. 
Huntington. 2 .. L 
Huntington. 25. 
Huntington. 2 I & ·n 
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into history" will be invigorated, the result of which will be prolonged and violent conflicts. 134 
In sum, Huntington's theory is based on the assumption that as a result of their differing 
cultural heritages, people. or groups of people from different civilisations, are much more 
likely to conflict with each other, than people, or groups of people, from the same civilisation. 
Thus. according to Huntington, the divisive and unitying force of culture shapes and defines 
the nature of conflict in the post-Cold War world135 For example, during situations of war, 
"groups and states belonging to one civilization (will) naturally try to rally support from other 
members of their own civilization.,,136 Huntington uses the cases of the Gulf War, the former 
Yugoslavia and Bosnia as evidence of civilisational rallying or "'kin-country' syndrome,,,137 
Despite the fact that the Gulf War saw one Arab state invading another, with "only a few 
Muslim governments overtly support(ing) Saddam Hussein." Huntington believes that 
civilisational rallying was evident because "many Arab elites privately cheered (Hussein) 
"nl! Add" II H' . f h ., h f h 1 A b I' on. . ltIona y, untmgton IS 0 t e opmlOn 1. at most o. t e genera .. ra popu atlOn. 
together with the entire Islamic resurgence movement, rallied against the Western coalition 
and supported Saddam Hussein. 139 The fact that radical Islamic groups branded Hussein a 
secular apostate is completely overlooked by Huntington, who also seems unaware that Osama 
bin Laden initially offered his own services in the defense of Saudi Arabia against Iraq. 140 
Huntington's most often referred to example of civilisational rallying, the Bosnian conflict, 
also does not support his thesis of a clash of civilisations. Although "the breakup of the 
I., I Huntington, 25 & 2(, 
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former Yugoslavia pitted \1uslim Turks. Slavic Serbian Orthodox Christians and Roman 
Catholic Croats against one another, little else about this tragic contlict conforms to 
Huntington's expectations. ,,141 Huntington explains "the continuation and intensification of 
the fighting among Croats, Muslims and Serbs in the former Yugoslavia," entirely in terms of 
inter-civilisationaL or more specifically, inter-religious. contlict. 142 Besides there being three 
different civilisations. or more specifically, three different religions, involved in the Bosnisn 
conflict Huntington fails to acknowledge any other factors that could have explained the 
vicious eruption of violence in the Balkans. 143 Although religion played a vital role in the 
conflict it was the way in which religious sensibilities were exploited and manipulated for 
political gain that defined the true nature of any civilisational rallying. The genocidal 
campaign against the Bosnian Muslims was not, as Huntington argues, the inevitable product 
of "'ancient hatreds," which were released with the end of the Cold War. "To the contrary, 
history shows that patterns of religious interaction in the regIon were often humane and 
benevolent to all kindsd44 
(b) Islam versus the West: Ancient Civilisations at \Var 
Contrary to Huntington's repeated assertions that "for the first time in history, global politics 
has become multipolar and multicivilizational,,,14s his theory is rigidly focused on "the West 
and the rest" map of the world,14b but more particularly on a world that is supposed to be 
111 Dayid Skidmore. "Huntington' s Clash Revisited:' in Journal ol Irorld-S\'srems Research ~ (Fall 1998): 
1l)5 
Ie Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash olCil'ilizafions and the Remaking of' If'orld Order (London: Simon & 
Schuster. 1996).38 & 127. 
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q~ R. Scott Appleby. 7111' Amhiralence of the .Sacred: Religiol1. r "/(,Ience and Reconciliation (U.S.A.: 
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historically divided "between Western Christianity, on the one hand, and Orthodox 
Christianity and Islam, on the other."147 
Huntington's theory of post-Cold War world politics is based on the assumption that "the fault 
lines between civilizations are the flash points for crisis and bloodshed."14x Huntington 
believes that the most significant cultural fault line is the one that runs through the Balkans -
this line historically coincided with the boundary between the Hapsburg and Ottoman empires. 
A d· H' , .. 149 . ceor mg to untmgton s approximatIOns: 
"The peoples to the north and west of this line are Protestant or Catholic; they shared the 
common experience of European history - feudalism, the Renaissance, the Reformation, 
the Enlightenment, the French Revolution, the Industrial Revolution; they are generally 
economically better off than the people to the east; and they may look forward to 
increasing involvement in a common European economy and to the consolidation of 
democratic political systems." 
"The peoples to the east and south of this line are Orthodox or Muslim; they historically 
belonged to the Ottoman or Tsarist empires and were only lightly touched by the shaping 
events in the rest of Europe; they are less advanced economically; they seem much less 
likely to develop stable democratic political systems" I~O 
Like many other scholars, Huntington assumes that "the most dangerous cultural conflicts" are 
the ones that occur along "the line separating Western Christianity, on the one hand, from 
Muslim and Orthodox peoples on the otheL,,!51 Besides for the events that took place in the 
---- --~ .. -.~.-.-.-
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former Yugoslavia, Huntington claims that centuries of "conflict along the fault line between 
Western and Islamic civilizations" are proof that there is a clash between Islam and the 
West. 152 Huntington 'borrowed' much of his 'clash' thesis from one of the West's foremost 
historians of Islam, Bernard Lewis. Lewis first coined the notion of "a clash of civilizations" 
in his controversial article "The Roots of Muslim Rage"m Much like his other writings on 
Western-Islamic relations, this article - published in The Atlantic lvf()l1Ih~v three years before 
Huntington made his biggest debut claims that the current struggle between Western and 
Islamic civilisations can be traced back to the advent of Islam in the seventh century I '-I 
Huntington believes that "this centuries-old military interaction between the West and Islam is 
unlikely to decline.,,!55 In fact, at the time his Foreign Affairs article was published, 
Huntington predicted that the 'clash' would violently accelerate into the future. 156 
3.3 The Causes of the 'Clash' between Islam and the \Vest: A Critical 
Analysis 
a) The Similarities between Islam and Western Christianity 
According to Huntington, the causes of the ongoing pattern of conflict between the West and 
Islam flow from the nature of the Christian and Islamic religions and the civilizations based on 
them. Huntington acknowledges that centuries of conflict can be partly attributed to the 
similarities between Christianity and Islam. 157 As Bernard Lewis points out. both religions are 
monotheistic, i.e., they both adhere to the doctrine or belief that there is only one God and that 
they are the sole possessors of the true interpretation of God's word. ISS Unlike polytheistic 
l)~ Sanlucl P. Huntington .. '""The Clash of Ciyilizations'?-- in F()reign ~-I,lrajrs 72 (-SUlnll1cr 1993): 31 & 32. 
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religions. monotheistic religions are inherentlv inclined to "see the world in dualistic. us-and-- - ....... '" -
them terms ,,159 In addition, their universalistic nature requires their adherents to proselytise 
God's message through the creation of world religions. 16i) Thus, from their inception, both 
Christianity and Islam often "expanded by conquest," 161 describing each other as infidels that 
"had to be resisted and overcome.,,162 Throughout the centuries Christians and Muslims have. 
at one time or another, perceived each other as a threat to the existence and proliferation of 
their religions. This perception. as well as a number of other factors, determined the nature of 
centuries of conflict between Western and Islamic civilisations. 163 Huntington thus rejects the 
idea that Christians and Muslims could form a multicultural society based on peace and 
respect 164 Instead, he focuses entirely on those factors that can be viewed as a source of 
divergence between Western and Islamic civilisations. 165 
b) Differences between the West and Islam 
i) Democracy and Secularism versus Anti-Democracy and the Non-Separation of Religion and 
Politics 
According to Huntington. there are 2 key differences between Islamic and Western cultures. 
The first, which will be discussed in this section, is that the West is characterised by 
representative democracies and the Middle East is not. According to Huntington. as well as 
the other scholars who share his views. this difference is directly linked to the West's 
. Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash o,fCivifizalions and the Remaking o,fWorld Order (London: Simon & 
Schuster. 1996). 210 & 211. 
loU Bcnlard Le\yis_]:"JaI11 and the Hesl (U.S.A.: Oxford Uni\'ersity Press. 1993).5. 
11>1 Samuel P. Huntinglon. The Clash o/Civilizariol1s and the Remakin? o,f World Order (London: Simon & 
Schuster. J (96). 211. 
]('C Bernard Lcwis. Islam and {he Irest (U.S,A: Oxford Uni\ersil,Y Press. 1993). 7. 
II;, Lewis. 8. 
I(;·l Benjamin R. Barber. "Fantasy of Fcar: Huntington and the West \'ersus the Rest." in lIarvard 
Internarional Rel'jell' 20 (Winter 97) Ayai1ablc: h.lliJ:l/search.epnet.com/directasp?an=26193&db=aph accessed 
on 15/IO/O~ 
I",. Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash ojCil'ilizations and [he Remakin? o,f World Order (London: Simon & 











separation of church and state (secularism) and the Muslim world's non-separation of religion 
and politics. 
Huntington's 'clash> thesis argues that "there are sharp cultural differences between the core 
political values common in societies sharing a Western Christian heritage ... and the beliefs 
common in the rest of the world, especially Islamic societies.,,166 Although Huntington is 
correct in assuming that "contemporary values in different societies are path-dependent, 
reflecting long-standing legacies associated with core civilizations" is correct,167 his argument 
is biased towards the Euro-centric claim that "the strongest distinguishing characteristic of 
Western culture, the aspect which demarcates Western Christianity most clearly from the 
Muslim and Orthodox worlds, concerns the values associated with representative 
d ,,]61< d' emocracy. Accor mg to Huntington: 
"The Muslim world lacks the core political values that gave birth to representative 
democracy in Western civilization: separation of religious and secular authority, rule of 
law and social pluralism, parliamentary institutions of representative government, and 
protection of individual rights and civil liberties as the buffer between citizens and the 
f h ,,1(;'1 power 0 testate. 
Huntington's attack on the Islamic world "seems all too plausible given the failure of electoral 
democracy to take root throughout the Middle East and North Africa."170 However, the fact 
that Freedom House categorises "none of the core Arabic-speaking societies" as electoral 
democracies, with "only one fourth ,.. among the 47 countries with a Muslim majority" 
166 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, "Islam & the West: Testing the 'Clash of Ci\ilizations' Thesis" (5 
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falling into this category, does not prove HuntinbTton's peSSIlTIlSm about the Muslim world 
correct. The fact that most Muslim majority countries can not be classified as electoral 
democracies does not mean that Muslim people or the Islamic religion are unsupportive of 
democratic values and ideals. 171 In fact, when Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart tested 
Huntington's 'clash of civilisations' thesis against empirical evidence from the 1995-2001 
waves of the World Values Survey, they discovered that there are "striking similarities in the 
political values" held in the West and Islamic worlds. 172 
The World Values Survey reveals that, "at this point in history, societies throughout the world 
(Muslim and Judeo-Christian alike) see democracy as the best form of government.,,]73 
However, the fact that "the people of the Muslim world overwhelmingly want democracy," 
does not mean democracy is sustainable in their societiesl74 Unlike Huntington, who believes 
that there is something about the religious culture of Islam and Islamic people that prevents 
democratic political models succeeding in the Muslim world,175 Norris and Inglehart consider 
the influence of factors such as levels of per capita income and education on the sustainability 
t'd ' M'ddl E ' , 176 Th 'd b' d ' o emocracy m . 1 eastern socleties. us, to avo! emg rawn mto an argument 
about Islam's necessary incompatibility with democracy, one must first consider that most 
Muslim majority states face a wide range of social and political barriers to democracy.177 
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Critics such as John Esposito condemn the view that "Islam is inherently antidemocratic and 
intolerant or that at best, it is 'not hospitable to democracy. ,,,178 Esposito states that this 
assumption is an "easy excuse" for the West to keep looking the other way and continue 
" " M"cicil E "]7') A. d" . H" t' "I supportmg autocratIc ... L_.e _astern reg!mes.· . ceor mg to EspOSIto, untmgton m.s to 
acknowledge the role authoritarian leaders play in preventing democratic reforms in the 
i\1iddle East. In addition, Huntington does not recognise the ways in which the West has 
blocked democratisation and development in order to further it's own strategic interests in the 
'1 . h . 11-:0 
01. nc .. regIon. 
Instead, Huntington chooses to believe that "the failure of electoral democracy to take root in 
most states in the Middle East and 'Jorth Africa" is a result of a Muslim preference for "strong 
leadership and rule by traditional religious authorities ,,11-:1 Although evidence from the World 
Values Survey revealed that "many more Muslims than Westerners supported the idea of 
religious authorities, there was widespread agreement with this idea in many other parts of the 
world including Sub-Saharan Africa and Catholic Latin America."m Thus, the non-
separation of religious and political authority is "by no means specific to Islam"Il:\.~ In fact, 
despite the West's stance that public institutions should be secular. the World Values Survey 
reported that two fifths of the Americans surveyed believe that "politicians who do not believe 
in God are unfit for public office. ,,11<4 According to Norris and Inglehart, findings from the 
World Values Survey reveal that despite "a strong societal role by religious authorities" 
I'~ John L. Esposito. The Islamic Threat: ;\fvth or Reality (U.S.A: Oxford University Press. 1992).21·" 
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proving far more favourable in Islamic societies than in the West, I 1<5 "most of the Muslim 
countries surveyed (with the exception of Pakistan) think highly of democracy.,,186 In fact 
"contrary to Huntington's thesis, compared with Western societies, support for democracy was 
marginally slightly stronger (not weaker) among those living in Islamic societies."m This 
information effectively challenges the commonly held assumption that a non-separation of 
religion and politics is incompatible with the values and principles of democracy. 
However, in spite of this evidence, many scholars continue to advance the view that support 
for democratic ideals is unique to the West Huntington's prediction that "democratic values 
will be most deeply and widely entrenched in Western societies" is based on the belief that 
"the political values of democracy originated in the West with the separation of church and 
,,11<8 A. d' L'" 'd I kId d h h " f l' , state. _ ccor mg to eWls, It IS WI e.y ac nowe ge Lat Le ongms 0, secu.ansm, I.e, 
"the idea that religion and political authority, church and state are different, and can or should 
be separated, are Christian. 189 Although there is a general consensus that the idea of 
secularism dates back to the New Testament, "in which Christ is quoted as saying, 'render 
therefore unto Caesar the things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are 
( ' d' ",190 hI' 1 1 W . k . h h "1 I TO S, SC 0 ars, partlcu,ar y non- estern ones, are qmc - to pomt out t .at t e ega 
. Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. "[slam & the West: Testing the 'Clash of Chilizations' Thesis" (5 
June 10021. 15. Ayailable: 
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Morocco. Iran and Egypt." See Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart. "Islam & the West Testing the 'Clash of 
Chilizatiolls' Thesis" (5 June 20(2). 8. Ayailable: 
http://ksghomc.har\ard.eduJ~.pnorris.shorenstein.ksgjAcrobaticlash%200f'}o20Ci\'ilization. pdf accessed on 
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. f h h d ,-]91· " d W E r h " ,,19') separatIOn 0 c urc. an state> 1S a mo ern .. estern, post-lUg tenment constmct· -
In other words, "the modern notions of religion as a system of belief for personal life". "is 
relatively new.,,19] Historically, "all the world's religions". were fairly comprehensive ways 
of living."l,}') Mohammed Arkoun agrees that "any effort to contrast from their moments of 
origin a Christianity that distinguishes between" the realms of "political power" and "spiritual 
authority," and "an Islam that mixes them would be hasty, superficial, and unacceptable 
because it would not take account of ... historical conditions.,,195 
Thus, in order to understand the current differences between Islam and Christianity with 
regards to the separation of church and state, one must be aware of the historical context in 
which that religion emerged. The famous dictum, i.e., "render therefore unto Caesar the 
things which are Caesar's; and unto God the things that are God's,,,196 can only be understood 
"if we recall that Palestine in the time of Christ was under Roman authority."J97 Due to the 
tact that "the political order was linked to the Roman Empire, the religious establishment 
could take no political initiative without referring to Rome. In this context, the only means for 
a man of religion to affirm any authority whatsoever was to remain entirely within spiritual 
and religious planes.,,198 Thus, the words of Jesus laid claim to a distinctive Christian 
1"1 Mohammcd Arkoun. Rethinking Islam: Common Questions. ['l1colflmOl1 Answers (US.A.: Wcst,icw 
Prcss. 199-+). 18. 
1):' John L Esposito. lhe Islamic 111reat: .\/yth or Reality (USA. Oxford UniYersity Press. 19Y2). 231. 
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institution - the church. Like the state, the church had, and continues to have, "its own laws 
d · . d" . h' h d h' f h . ,,199 an Juns IctlOns, Its own lcrarc y an c. am o. aut onty. 
It is well documented that "the political and religious situation of Arabia at the beginning of 
the seventh century differed in essential ways from that of Palestine in the time of Jesus.,,2()O 
The world into which the Prophet Muhammad was born was characterised as being a chaotic 
desert wasteland,20] in which competing tribal loyalties divided and weakened the pre-Islamic 
Arabia. 202 On the night of the 17 Ramadan in 6] 0 Muhammad received his first 
revelation from God. However, "it was only in 612 that Muhammad felt empowered to preach 
and gradually gained converts," many of whom cam from the poorer clans in Mecca203 
According to Karen Armstrong, one of the world's leading authorities on Islam, Muhammad, 
similarly to Jesus, "insisted it was wrong "to build a private fortune, but good to share wealth 
and create a society where the weak and vulnerable were treated with respect ,,204 Muhammad 
warned his tribe, the Quraysh, which was also the leading tribe of Mecca, that if they "did not 
mend their ways, their society would collapse. because they were violating the fundamental 
laws of existence.,,205 As such, the core teaching of the new scripture, the Koran, was "the 
demand that human beings behave to one another with justice, equity and compassion. ,,206 
This teaching of social justice, which insisted upon the implementation of democratic rights, 
was confronted with "open persecution." The reigning Meccan leaders vowed to exterminate 
)~9 Bemard Lewis. Whar Wel1l Wrong? The Clash RetH'een Islam . Inc! .\Iodernin In The .\/idd/e Jc:ast 
(London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson. 2002). 98. 
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the man who threatened their position of power and privilege. 207 So in the year 622 C E, the 
Prophet Muhammad and his followers made their migration (hUm) to Yathrib, "later renamed 
al Madina, the City of the Prophet. ,,208 "From the moment of his arrival at Medina, 
Muhammad assumed a different role. From prophecy he was pressed into administration. . .. 
The prophet was (thus) transformed into a statesman,,,209 and at the same time "Islam became 
institutionalized as a state. ,,210 Hence, the city of Medina came to represent the ideal Islamic 
state,211 in which "all aspects of human life," public and private, were regulated according to 
Shari 'a law. Unlike Western civilisation, which draws a distinction "between canon law and 
civil law, between the law of the church and the law of the state," i.e., the separation of 
religion and politics, Muslims are governed by "a single law" that is accepted as being of 
d·· .. 212 lVlDe ongm. 
ii) Islam: An Inherently Violent Religion 
In his article, "The Roots of Muslim Rage," Bernard Lewis implies that the non-separation of 
religion and politics is much to blame for the current "mood of hatred and violence" directed 
against the West. 213 The rise of Islamic DJndamentalist movements in the late 19705 was in 
large part a defensive reaction against the process and consequences of secularisation.2l4 
Fundamentalist movements of all faiths express an innate fear that secular establishments are 
Huston Smith. 771e If'orld's Religions (New York: HarperSanFrancisco. 1991). 227 & 228. 
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"determined to wipe religion OUt.,,2IS In order "to wrest religion out of its marginal position 
and back to center stage a "small minority of fundamentalists" commit acts of shocking and 
'-. '-
extreme violence216 Fundamentalists who use terror in their stmggle to halt the modern trend 
towards secularism are generally referred to as radical fundamentalists iil Radical Islamic 
fundamentalists such as Osama bin Laden and the 9/11 hijackers espouse a militant "ideology 
that provides 'the faithful' with a plan of action" designed to undermine the values and 
. ., t' J 21R pnnClp.es o. uemocracy. 
Thus. it is the argument of this thesis that unlike the majority of Muslims who support 
democracy,219 radical Islamic ftmdamentalists are determined to provoke a clash between 
Western and Islamic civilisations by claiming to represent the religious and political 
grievances of all Muslims. 22o Huntington, however, disagrees with this line of reasoning and 
states that "the underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism." or in this 
case radical Islamic fundamentalism. but Islam '<a different civilization whose people are 
convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their 
nower ,,221 
F .. 
According to Huntington, the entire Islamic civilisation is a threat to the West Contrary to 
evidence provided by the World Values Survey. Huntington claims that "it is hard to find any 
Muslims ... praising Western values and institutions" this being just one example of how he 
Karen Armstrong. The Battle!br God (New York: Alfred & Knopf. 2000). 1-1-1. 
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continuously lumps all Muslims together as being instinctively anti-Western222 Huntington 
links anv Islamic criticism of the West regardless of whether it may be constructive, to 
intolerant behaviour that will naturally lead to violence, although his own criticism of the 
West's arrogance with regards to uniting the world through 'universal' values, will of course 
not 223 In addition, Huntington goes to great lengths to explain that unlike Western people, 
whose violence is at least restrained in times of war, Muslims have a much higher propensity 
toward violent conflict. For example, between 1928 and 1979, the United Kingdom and the 
United States resolved more than 80 percent of their international crises using rational and 
non-violent means. Muslim states, on the other hand, resorted to "high-intensity violence" in 
over half of the crises in which they were involved. 22 -l Huntington states that although his 
evidence is based on the results of "a casual survey of inter-civilizational conflicts," he feels 
confident to make profound judgments such as "Muslim bellicosity and violence are late-
twentieth-century facts which neither Muslims nor non-Muslims can deny.,,225 
According to Huntington, the 'fact' that "Muslims are involved in far more inter-group 
violence than people of other civilizations," is particularly disturbing if one considers the 
Christian trend away from violent conflict 226 In order to understand why "Islam's borders are 
bloody,,,227 Huntington provides a list of causes, which he believes explain the historical and 
the contemporary Muslim propensity toward group violence 22 1< Like many Western scholars, 
Huntington relies on stereotypical arguments that portray Islam as a religion that encourages 
Huntington. 2 D . 
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violence. The fact that the Prophet Muhammad was "a hard fighter and a skilful military 
commander" is, more often than not, associated with Islam being a religion that "glorifies 
'I' , ,,229 mLltary vlrtues. 
However, as previously discussed, an understanding of the historical conditions in which 
Islam emerged, reveals that Muhammad had no other option but to defend the Islamic 
, '" h h f I ' , ,,230 0' d' 1 ' h communIty agamst 1. e treat 0 tota extmction. Isregar mg counLess passages m t e 
Koran that advocate peace and compassion,2J' Huntington joins the bandwagon that maintains 
h b r f h "h n . f I I n' . b I' ,,232 Th' I Le e.le t at t e _octnnes o. s am ... _!ctate war agamst un e levers. ..!S common y 
held assumption leads Huntington to the conclusion that Muslims suffer from a unique 
disposition 'indigestibility.' According to Huntington, "the 'indigestibility' of Muslims" 
explains their inability to tolerate "living in close physical proximity" to non-Muslim 
groups:m Huntington states that this characteristic, as well as the other 'cultural differences' 
mentioned above, provides sufficient cause for conflict between Islamic and Western 
civilisations. 234 
~~') Hunlington. 26~. 
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must learn to appreciate each other." See .A.kbar S. Ahmed. Islam ['nder .Siege: U\'ing f)al1gerous~v in a Pos!· 
f{ol1or World (United Kingdom: Polity Press, 20(3).·J Another famous example is the reycIation God made 
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3.4 September 11 th and the Applicability of the "Clash' Thesis 
a) The Significance of Huntington's 'Clash of Civilisations' Theory and How it Applies 
to 9111 
Contrary to the Realist assumption that "all '" non-state actors in world politics are of lesser 
significance" than the state,235 the 9111 suicide terrorist attacks were acts of war perpetrated by 
19 "poorly armed" men2 .l6 These men were not acting on behalf of their countries of origin, 
Instead, they claimed that they were representatives of Islam, In his speeches, bin Laden 
claims to speak on behalf of all Muslims and openly seeks to provoke a clash of civilisations 
between Islam and the West. For example, in October 200 I, Bin Laden stated, "this battle is 
not between AI Qaeda and the U.S, This is a battle of Muslims against the global 
crusaders, ,,2) 7 
The September 11 th attacks, as well as statements made by Osama bin Laden and other l~J 
Qaeda members, "prompted a blizzard of speculation in the media on the nature and scale of 
the 'Islamic threat. ",238 Despite President George W, Bush's repeated declarations that 
praised Islam as "a religion of peace,,,239 the rhetoric associated with Huntington's 'clash' 
thesis remained "thick in the air,,,240 For example, politicians such as Silvio Berlusconi, who 
"reasserted the view that the underlying problem for the West is not terrorism or even Islamic 
fundamentalism but Islam, i,e" a rival and inferior civilization," mimicked the broad 
generalisations for which Huntington is famous 241 Huntington is responsible for perpetuating 
:35 Timothy Dunne. "Realism:' ch,6 in The Gluhalization ol World PolitiCS: .-InIntroduCTiol1 to International 
Relations. cds, John Baylis and Ste\e Smith (New York Oxford Ulliyersity Press. 1997). 118 . 
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an Orientalist discourse that has, since "the late eighteenth century," constructed an I slam that 
"has alw'ays signified danger and threat" to the West242 
The fact that many Muslims strongly oppose U. S foreign policy in the Middle East does not 
mean, as Huntington suggests, that "the great majority of Muslims" support the use of 
violence against the West 243 As noted in chapter two, bin Laden exploits politically 
contentious issues such as Palestine in order to rally support for his acts of terror - all of which 
are justified in accordance with his own radical interpretation of Islam. It is bin Laden's 
interpretation of Islam, and not the Islamic civilisation, which is a threat to the West, as well 
as all those who support the values and principles of democracy, which according to evidence 
from the 1995-2001 waves of the World Values Survey is the majority of Muslims. 
Similarly, "Western leaders seeking to build a coalition against the followers of Osama bin 
Laden, took pains to distance themselves from the clash of civilizations thesis, stressing deep 
divisions within the Islamic world between the extreme fundamentalists and moderate 
l\1uslims."2--14 Most importantly, leaders across the world emphasised that "the events of 
September 11 arose from the extreme ideological beliefs held by ... Al Qaeda and Taliban 
fundamentalists, not mainstream Muslim public opinion,,245 The fact that radical Islamic 
fundamentalists are "fighting their own governments,,,2-i6 particularly those allied with the 
.:;~.:; Edward W. Said. Oriemalism (London: the Penguin Group. 1978l. 3 & 26. 
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U.S., e.g., Saudi Arabia and Egypt, shows that 9111 cannot be defined as a clash of 
civilisations. 247 
b) The Reactions to September nth were Not Reflective oftbe 'Kin-Country' Syndrome 
[t is thus the argument of this thesis that the suicide terrorist attacks that occurred on 
September 11 th 2001, as well as the reactions to them: disprove 'the clash of civilisations' 
theory, which is to a large extent based on the notion of 'kin-country' syndrome. According to 
Huntington, in post-Cold War world, "the principal basis for cooperation and coalitions" is 
,. "1' . I 11' ,.248 F I I" h h H' . d . 'clvLlzatlOna ra .ymg. . or examp e, ear ler m t e c .apter, _ untmgton IS quote as saymg 
that "groups or states belonging to one civilization that become involved in war with people 
from a different civilization naturally try to rally support from members of their own 
civilization. ,,249 
In an interview with Ben Wattenberg, Huntington states that the reactions to 9111 were "very 
much along civilizational lines.,,25o Huntington believes that the evidence to support this 
claim is that "following September eleventh, ... the countries that are closest to us culturally -
Britain, Canada, Australia - immediately came forward. sent military forces to work with 
ours. The reaction in Europe ... was again enthusiastic sympathy and expressions of 
2"1 support.'" Huntington states that unlike the Western civilisation's reaction, the response 
from the Muslim world was "very ambivalent. ,,252 
21-. It is not a coincidence that the 19 hijackers were from Saudi Arabia and Egypt. See Peter L. Berger. Ho~v 
War. Inc. Inside the S'e('ret World of Os am a bin Ladell (London: Phoenix. 20(2)- 203 & 228. 
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Contrary to Huntington's analysis of the reactions to 911 L evidence "from Saudi Arabia to 
Pakistan. from Iran to Indonesia," showed that "Islamic nations distanced themselves from the 
theology of Osama bin Laden ,,253 Muslim religious leaders "roundly condemned the acts of 
9 110 L "F~ denouncing bin Laden and his politics as un-Islamic. ,,255 In addition, most 
Muslim-majority states, including the devout Muslim nation of Pakistan, which was "among 
the first to offer military facilities to the L.S.," responded to 9111 by "offering the U.S. 
"material and logistical assistance.,,256 So, in responding to September 11th, governments in 
the Middle East and Asia had the same reactions as those in the Western world "they 
overv.fhelmingly sided with Washington,,257 One can therefore conclude that contrary to 
Huntington's culturally deterministic theory, "states acted more as states than as 
civilizations. ,,2S~ 
3.5 A Final C.-itique 
a) Islam is ~ot an Anti-Democratic and Violent Monolithic Entity 
Most of the criticisms levelled against Huntington after the September 11th suicide attacks 
were the same weaknesses that have plagued his theory since its inception in 1993. While the 
events of 9111 all committed 'in the name of Islam' seem to accentuate and reinforce 
cultural stereotypes that present Islam as anti-democratic and inherently violent, it has been 
shown throughout this chapter that Islam is not incompatible with the values of peace and 
democracy. In addition, the fact that authoritarian governments dominate the Middle East is 
AmitaY Acharya. "State-Society Relations: Asian and World Order after Scptember I L" ch.17 in World~ 
in Collision. Terror and the Future olGlobal Order. cds. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (Nc\\ York: Palgraye 
Macmillan. 2(02). 19~ & 195. 
~5~ Tinl Luke~ ~·On 9.11.01 u in Telo.s" 120 (SU111111er 2(01): 131. 
.A,kbar S. Ahmed. Islam Cnder Siege: Living Dangerolls(v in a Post-Honor World (United Kingdom: 
Polity Press. 20(3). 29. 
c'iI" , Amitm Acharya. "State-Society Relations: Asian and World Order after September I L" ch.17 in Worlds 
in Collision: Terror and The Fil1ure ofG/ohal Order. eds. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (New York: Palgraye 
Macmillan. 2(02). ll)). 
Acharya. 1l)5 . 










not according to Norris and Inglehart, as well as others such as Kabuli, Esposito, VolL Shadid 
and Said, a retlection of Islam's core values and teachings25,} However. Huntington, as well 
as anyone who promotes the 'clash' thesis, obscures a complex reality by portraying the idea 
that all Muslim people belong to a threatening and unified bloc. 
Thus, the criticism most often attributed to Huntington is the way in which he lumps all 
Muslims together, overstating the coherence of the 'Islamic civilisation,2Mi - a concept that has 
been widely criticised for failing to consider the various aspects of a Muslim person's 
'd . 261 • • 
I entIty. Huntmgton's cntics challenge "the notion of a single Islamic culture, pointing to 
substantial contrasts found among one billion people living in diverse Islamic nations.,,262 
Robert Kaplan states, "because Huntington's brush is broad, his specifics are vulnerable to 
attack.,,26J Jonathan Fox concurs by noting that for the most part, "Huntington's list and 
description of civilization is ... not nearly specific enough for use in categorizing groups. ,,264 
For example, one of Huntington's fiercest critics, Fouad AjamL explains that "the Islamic 
world is not even remotely monolithic: that in Iran the birthplace of Islamic revolution, many 
young people are in earnest rebellion against fundamentalist critics~ that Saddam Hussein 
came to dictatorial power as an avowed secularist and waged war for a decade against Iran; 
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that leaders in Egypt and Jordan found a way to sign a peace treaty with Israel: that in places 
as various as Egypt and Turkey modernity and secularism '" have proved resilient against 
profound challenge - in short, that 'the world of Islam divides and sub-divides, ",265 
Huntington denies portraying all Muslim people as a single monolithic entity266 However, his 
denial is made redundant by his assumption that the great majority of Muslims are not 
moderate: instead they are violent people, especially in comparison to the people of other 
civilisations267 Thus, Huntington makes no distinction between "Muslims who are radical or 
moderate, traditional or modern, conservative or liberaL hard-line or revisionist. ,,261< 
3.6 Conclusion 
The conclusion of this chapter is that the 9111 suicide terrorist attacks cannot be defined as 
being part of some sort of general 'clash of civilisations,' More specifically, the attacks on the 
World Trade Centre and the Pentagon were not caused by long-standing cultural differences 
between the West and Islam. In fact, many scholars have challenged the assumption that 
Western and Islamic values are, as Huntington suggests, diametrically opposed to one another. 
Evidence from the 1 995-200 1 waves of the World Values Survey shows that although the West 
is characterised by secular democratic institutions and Islamic countries advocate a non-
separation of religion and politics, the majority of Muslim people strongly support the values 
and principles of democracy, Huntington's 'clash' thesis is completely flawed because it does 
not differentiate between the actions perpetrated by the 9111 hijackers, who interpret Islam in a 
radically militant manner, and the rest of the Muslim population, who, regardless of their 
:",5 Hendrik Hertberg and David Rcmnick. 'The Trap:' in The Yell' l'orker (2~ September 2(01), 
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2(·6 Michael Steinberger. "Inten'ie\\: So, are civilisations at war')" (21 October 200 It 2, Available: 
http://\n\,,,obscn'er.guardian,co,ukJislam/ston'/0.1~~2.577982,OO,html accessed on 23/10/03, 
:~., Samuel P Huntington, The Clash of Cil'i lizaliol1s and the Remaking of lI'orld Order (London: Simon & 
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Radical Islamic Fundamentalism: The l\tlost Probable Cause 
of the 9/11 Suicide Terrorist Attacks 
4.1 Introduction 
It has been established that the September 11 th suicide terrorist attacks were not evidence of a 
'clash' between the Muslim world and the West that the 9111 hijackers were "not 
representative of Islam.,,269 Despite this fact, the 9111 hijackers do represent a part of Islam 
"a radical, fundamentalist part",270 with most scholars supporting the view that the motives 
behind the September 11th attacks were only religious in the sense that they expressed "a 
radical, politicized form" of the Islamic religion271 
The aim of this chapter is to show how radical Islamic fundamentalism arose in response to 
the crisis Islam is contronted with in the twenty-first century, and how this defensive reaction 
against Western modernity and secularism has resulted in a small minority of radically 
militant Muslims - it is the values these radical Muslims hold that present the most probable 
cause of 9111. In addition, in an attempt to mobilise support, radical Islamic fundamentalists 
such as Osama bin Laden use religious and ideological rhetoric, which is based on a 
misinterpretation of the Koran, to justity acts of suicide terrorism . 
. Andrew Sulliyan, "This [s a Religious War," in Ihe .\·eHTork 1/mes (7 October 2001). Ayailable: 
wysiwyg:! / Ill/http://ww ... n~1imes.comI200 I .... htmPsearchp\=past 7days&pagewanted=print accessed on 
27 m:\/o2. 
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4.2 The Origins of Radical Islamic Fundamentalism 
a) The Islamic Decline 
An understanding of radical Islamic fundamentalism, particularly the role it played as the most 
probable cause of the September 11 th suicide terrorist attacks, is possible only when one is 
familiar with how it "emerged from the trauma of modern Muslim history. ,,27:2 
It is a well-documented fact that the Ottoman Empire was by far the most powerful the world 
had ever seen,27.~ and for many centuries Islam was "in the forefront of human civilization and 
achievement."n4 For most medieval Muslims the glory of the times was self-explanatory: 
"Islam represented the greatest military power on earth ,,275 As a consequence, its armies 
expanded the Muslim empire across the globe, achieving unprecedented economic status and 
success. Thus, the superiority of Islam as the greatest civilisation on earth was well grounded 
at the time, and the threat that it posed to Christendom resulted in a constant fear of an Islamic 
attack276 However, by the late seventeenth century Europe had made enormous strides in the 
arts and sciences, politics and economics, and most notably in the field of weaponry277 
According to Bernard Lewis, Islamic societies only adopted from the Europeans "what was 
recognisably and immediately useful - weaponry, naval construction, the practice of medicine, 
along with some other devices. ,,278 These, however, were "stripped of their cultural 
associations and thus reduced to dead artifacts without organic roots." 279 As a result, by the 
early nineteenth century Islam posed no serious threat to Christendom, and a new era of 
:-=. Daniel Pipes. "Introduction [rom Militant Islam Reaches America." A\ailable: 
http://ww\\.daniclpi~s.orglbooks/mirainto,php accessed on 15/10103 . 
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European discoveries and expansIOn would eventually lead to the total collapse of the 
Ott E i 'P 2xo . omanmp.l~. 
The balance of power had thus shifted, and "in 1918 the Ottoman sultanate ... was finally 
defeated its capital. Constantinople, occupied, its sovereign held captive, and much of its 
territory partitioned between the victorious British and French Empires,,281 Many scholars 
have dubbed the Treaty of Versailles 'the mistake of the century,' and although this claim has 
been unfairly exaggerated, many Westerners and Muslims alike believe that there is a direct 
link between the decisions that were made at Versailles and present day conflicts in the Middle 
East 282 The protectorates and mandates that were set up in Iraq and Palestine for example, 
were "experienced as an outrage, since the European powers had promised the Arab provinces 
of the Ottoman Empire independence. ,,283 Furthermore, in 1948 the state oflsrael was created 
"with the support of the United Nations and the international community." 2x+ As is shown in 
chapter two, "the loss of Palestine became a symbol of the humiliation of the Muslim world at 
the hands of the Western powers, who seemed to feel no qualms about the dispossession and 
permanent exile of hundreds of thousands of Palestinians. ,,285 
This sense of betrayal and humiliation left, and continues to leave, many in the Muslim world 
searching for answers as to 'what went wrong.' How could a people who were once at the 
forefront of civilisation now find themselves subject to the humiliation of the modern and all 
powerful West')286 Scholars of Islamic and Middle Eastern studies have searched relentlessly 
::RI'. Bernard Lewis. 11 hat Went Wrong"! The Cfash between Is/alll and j[oderl1ltv in the .\fiddle J:'ast (London: 
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for an answer to this question. For scholars such as Samuel P. Huntington, the decline of 
Islam in the Middle Ages is a direct result of Islam's advocation of a non-separation of 
religion and politics - an aspect of Islamic culture that many believe poses "an obstacle to 
f n ." 11" . n 1 ,,2S7 .ree_om, to sCIence, as we .. as economIc _eve.opment. However, if this is true then 
"how is it that Muslim society in the past was a pioneer in all three, and this at a time when 
Muslims were much closer in time to the sources and inspiration of their faith than they are 
now()"2g~ 
In an attempt to understand Islam's 'fall from glory,' Muslim societies around the world began 
to examine their failures and weaknesses. In doing so, however, many Muslims do not 
perceive the problem as 'where did we go wrong'?' Instead, the blame for popular political 
grievances is often directed solely against the West, and more specifically against U.S. foreign 
policy in the Middle East. Authors as varied as John L. Esposito and Bernard Lewis agree that 
although "there have been:' and still are, some "good reasons for such blame," it is the way in 
which "specific teachers and doctrines and groups" exploit Islam's changed position in world 
politics that is the real problem. 289 
4.3 A ~Iacro Analysis of Radical Islamic Fundamentalism's Key Features 
and How these Differ from Modernist/Moderate Islam 
a) A Defensive Reaction Against Western Modernity and Secularism 
Fundamentalisms of all faiths share certain traits. First and foremost, fundamentalisms are 
"specific religious phenomena" that have formed "in reaction to, and in defense against, the 
n fl" n n . . ,,290 processes an_ consequences o. secu.anzatlOn an_ mo_ermzatlOn. 
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Although "the Western media often give the impression that the embattled and occasionally 
violent form of religiosity known as 'fundamentalism' is a purely Islamic phenomenon, ,,' this 
is not the case, Fundamentalism is a global fact and has surfaced in every major faith in 
t th bl f d it ,,291 response 0 ._e pro ems 0 our mo ern .. y, In fact fl..mdamentalism first surfaced in 
Christianity, in the United States, at the beginning of the twentieth century, According to 
Karen Armstrong, the reason why fundamentalism first appeared in the United States, and 
only became known in other parts of the world at a later date, is because "a fundamentalist 
I k h h h 0" .. f: d d ,,2')2 movement .,' on y ta .es s ape w en Le mo_ermzatlOn process IS qUlte _ar a vance ' 
This explains why "Islam was ,', the last to develop a fundamentalist strain, when modern 
culture began to take root in the Muslim world in the late 1960s and 1970s,,,2,)3 
Unlike the Western world, whose expenence of modernity became synonymous with 
"innovation and autonomy," the people of the Muslim world experienced the process of 
modernisation as an affront on their identity29-1 The Western impact on the Islamic world was 
perceived as a threat to traditional Islamic cultural values, This perception, however, was not 
a paranoid delusion, The destruction of the Ottoman Empire and the consequent colonisation 
of the Middle East subjected Muslim people to the "humiliation and disgrace" Osama bin 
laden referred to in his videotape of October 7, 200 )295 - the day LT, S, and coalition forces 
intervened in the Taliban's Aighanistan,296 Thus, essential for understanding the rise of 
radical Islamic fundamentalism, as well as its key features, is to see it within the context of "a 
::91 Karen Anllstrong. Islam: .1 Short /lis/ory (Grcat Britain: Phoenix Press. 20(0). I (),.J., 
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general feeling of decline and stagnation and a continued state of dependency,,,297 all of which 
were reacted to in an attempt to reassert a position of "cultural dominance.,,291< 
The experience of being displaced by secular modern thought whether it is via colonization or 
a by-product of globalisation, IS therefore important for understanding religious 
fundamentalisms. The advent of the twentieth century witnessed a rebuff of Enlightenment 
thought. which, since its inception in the late seventeenth century, "sought to displace religion 
as the source of valuesd99 The belief that "practical reason," i.e., science, could "fulfill the 
function of religion," challenged religious authority and "spurred the modern quest for the 
autonomy of man.,,300 The proliferation of Enlightenment thought into the twentieth century 
continued to oppose state religion and argued for the separation of church and state. Islam 
was thus plunged into a crisis of identity, with most Muslims questioning how it was possible 
that the lands of Islam could "be falling more and more under the domination of the secular 
godless West')"JO 1 
Most scholars of Islam and fundamentalism agree, the Muslim world's response to "the 
marginalization of religion," which occurred as a result of "the processes and consequences of 
secularization and modernization," was, and remains, twofoldJ02 As in every religious 
community, there are those who "try to assimilate with the new culture," and then there are 
others who "raise walls of defense and fight against the changes especially against their 
"r Shireen T. Hunter. "Introduction:' in 111e Politics of Is/alllle ReFimlism: Diversizv and CniZL ed. Shireen 
T.Hunter (U.S.A: Indiana UniYcrsity Press. (988). xii. 
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religion being displaced as a central culture shaping force ,,303 Those who "want to generate 
dialogue and understanding" with secular modern powers have been appropriately described 
as adopting an attitude of inclusion. 304 However, whilst fimdamentalists exploit the processes 
of secular modernisation for their own purposes for example, most fundamentalist movements 
adopt and master the use of "modern means of communication and recruitment,,,305 they are 
accurately labeled 'exclusivists' due to their rejectionist and confrontational attitude.iO() 
Thus, in responding to the very real challenges posed by the infiltration of secular modern 
culture into Middle Eastern societies, exclusivists, in this case radical Islamic fundamentalists, 
unlike their inclusivist or modernist/moderate counterparts, believe that the "religious 
vacuum" currently being filled by Western popular culture must be counteracted - either by 
restructuring the present Islamic establishments entirely or by operating outside of, ie, 
separating themselves from, jahili society]07 The concept of jahiliJJ'a, or "the period of 
'ignorance' or 'barbarism' before the Prophet Muhammad preached in Arabia," is central to 
radical Islamic fundamentalist thought. 30R According to Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), who was 
"the principal ideologue of the Muslim Brotherhood (f\,ffi) in EgypL"'\O'i and has more recently 
been dubbed "the father of Sunni radicalism,,31 (J and "the inspiration behind September 
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Ilell'/rolJl Within: .-1 Respol1setrom Without. cd. Nonnan 1. Cohen (Grand Rapids. Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans 
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11\11.,,1\ I '} 'I' '" t' t 'fi h' t . I . ei" 't h lei" . As b societ,'es . , ja 11 l)}'a IS no JUs a spec! IC IS onca peno_, I •• o._s sway In. a ..._ 
today,,,m In other words, "Islam has reverted to a state of jahilZl},L1,,,113 in which "true 
-:v1uslims" find themselves "adrift in a sea of ignorance and unbelief, akin to the un-Islamic 
societv in which Muhammad was born.,,31'" 
Qutb, whose teachings were greatly influenced by Abul Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), a 
Pakistani journalist who in 1941 founded the radical Islamic organisation Jamaat-i-Islami and 
was "the first Muslim thinker to arrive at a sweeping condemnation of modernity and its 
incompatibility with Islam," advanced the idea that due to the infiltration of Western 
modernity into Middle Eastern societies "'Islam in this century is in the process of losing its 
grip over society." 315 The brother of Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad Qutb, who taught Osama bin 
Laden Islamic studies at university in Jeddah,316 published lhe Jahi/zr}'a (llhe Twelllielh 
Centwy, which elaborated upon Sayyid's idea that Islam is in danger of being culturally 
poisoned by Western, and more specifically "man-centered," values and social mores such as 
"materialism" and "hedonism." "The core of Sayyid Qutb' s ideas thus consists in a total 
rejection of (Western) modernity ... since (Western) modernity represents the negation of 
God's sovereignty (hakimi.'~~va) in all fields of life and the relegation of religion to the dustbin 
fh' ,,317 o. .!story 
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Thus, like fundamentalists of all faiths, Qutb and Mawdudi based their ideology, which forms 
the foundation of radical Islamic fundamentalist thought, on "the doctrine of God's 
sovereignty "m: According to David Zeiden, a fundamentalist worldview "acknowledges 
God's absolute sovereignty over all of his creation including man, and over all spheres of life. 
In this worldview the world is God's world, and the central reference point is God, not 
man.,,319 Furthermore, much like other fundamentalists, who view the world from a 
"dualistic or Manichean" standpoint,320 Qutb and Mawdudi "recast the world into black and 
\vhite polarities. ,,321 Hence, Qutb' s belief that human beings face a "clear-cut choice: either to 
observe the Law of Allah in its entirety, or to apply the laws laid down by man of one sort or 
another,,322 For Mawdudi, "because God alone ruled human affairs and was the supreme 
legislator, human beings had no right to make up their own laws or take control of their own 
destiny,,323 By "attacking the whole notion of human freedom and human sovereignty," 
Mawdudi was "defying the whole secularist ethos,,324 
According to Mawdudi, Islam, unlike Western-style democracy, which leads to "chaos, greed 
and mob rule," is "a revolutionary ideology" that seeks to free human beings "from subjection 
to anything other than God.,,325 Contrary to the position adopted by most Muslims, even most 
Islamic fundamentalists, which argues that it is against the tenants of Islam for anyone but 
God to judge the authenticity of a Muslim's faith and that in accordance with the Shari 'a a 
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true Muslim need only profess the Islamic credo ("There is no other god than Allah and 
Muhammad is his messenger"); perform the 5 daily prayers and observe the fast of Ramadan, 
Mawdudi and Qutb adopted the views of Ibn Taymiyya, who stated that a professed Muslim or 
Muslim ruler ceases to be one when he/she fails to keep or apply the ,)'hari 'a?26 Qutb, for 
example, believed that any ruler who chose to apply secularist policies could be 
excommunicated or declared an apostate of the faith. In the case of President Nasser of Egypt, 
who "outwardly professed Islam, (but) his words and actions proved that he had in fact 
apostatized,,,327 Qutb assumed Mawdudi's position that "no filler who renlsed to govern 
according to God's wiH (as revealed in the Koran and the Sunnah) could command the 
obedience of his subjects. In such a case, "revolution was not simply a right, but a duty.,,32g 
b) A Radically Militant Interpretation ofIslam and Islamic Sacred Texts 
Fundamentalists of all faiths share a common trademark: their mark is that they '~fight 
back,,329 fundamentalists "want to reclaim a place they feel has been taken from them. They 
would restore what are presumed or claimed to be old and secure ways retrieved from a world 
they are losing. fundamentalists will do what it takes to assure their future in a world of their 
d fi ' ,,330 own e mmg. 
Fundamentalism in general is thus defined by its militancy, i.e" all fundamentalists are willing 
to fight - in some form or another - for their beliefs. However, unlike scholars such as Daniel 
P· h b ,. h 11 fi d r" b ' cl d ' I k'll ,,331 h' Ipes, woe leves t at a .m amenta.lsts must e conSLere potentIa 1 ers, t IS 
dissertation recognises a distinction between those fundamentalists who do not support the use 
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of terror and those that take a radically active militant stance that encourages the use of 
terrorism in order to achieve religious and political goals. According to Gabriel Ben-Doc the 
term radicalism refers to "those who would change society by the rooL or from the roOt."U2 
In contrast to the opinion espoused my the majority of Muslims, which, in this case, includes 
the position taken up by most moderate Islamic fundamentalists, radicals such as Osama bin 
Laden have adopted Qutb's attitude that there can be "no compromise" with current Muslim 
society. due to the fact that it has reverted to a state ofjahilixva in which infidel leaders 
I .U3 ru e. At the beginning of July 2003, bin Laden made a speech in which he urged young 
Muslims to purify Islam of "flawed modem Western values, such as 'materialism' and 
'secularism,,33-+ Like Qutb, bin Laden condemns the mlers of the Middle East as apostates and 
accuses leaders such as Hussein bin Ali and his family of conspiring "against the Ottoman 
Caliphate with the British." thus blaming the region's rulers and those who support them for 
""the fall of the Islamic Caliphate state. ,,335 
According to Olivier Roy, Islamic fundamentalist thought is "obsessed ... with the restoration 
of the caliphate,,,·H6 which for nearly 13 centuries "remained a potent symbol of Muslim unity, 
even identity; its disappearance under the double assault of foreign imperialists and domestic 
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modernists, was felt throughout the f\.,1uslim world ,,337 The fact that "many Muslims are still 
painfully aware of this void" is exploited by Islamic fundamentalists,3ill who according to 
Olivier Roy, are united in their acknowledgement that gaining control of political power is a 
necessity if the ideal of reconstituting the Muslim community (ul11l11a) under a single power is 
~ ...... ..-' I."... ... 
b d r .1.19 to e rna e a rea.Ity 
Thus, in keeping with Roy's analysis, the split within Islamic fundamentalism, i.e, the split 
between moderate and radical Islamic fundamentalists "lies not on the question of the 
necessity of an Islamic state.,,340 The split does, however, lie "on the means by which to arrive 
at one and the attitude to adopt with respect to the powers in place ,,341 Moderate Islamic 
fundamentalists advocate "a refonnist position,,,342 which according to Hudaybi, who was a 
dissident member of the MB in the 1950s, includes educational endeavours such as 
propagating, "preaching, admonishing and trying to bring people back to Right Path. "J·B 
However, unlike radical Islamic fundamentalism, which "reappropriates the idea of revolution: 
the forceful overthrow of a political regime in order to replace it with a system founded on a 
different ideology," moderate Islamic fundamentalism adheres to traditional Islamic thought in 
the sense that it "reject(s) the concept of excommunication, considering in the tradition of the 
ulamas (the clerical scholars), that an unjust power is preferable to division in the community 
«(itna). ,,344 
:..r Bernard Lc\Yis~ 711e C"risis (~.r Isla111: ll()~~' lrar and t"nho(l' Terror (London: \Vcidenfield & Nicolson. 
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Unlike moderate Islamic fundamentalists, who seek to promote non-violent change from 
within the current Islamic system,345 radicals such a bin Laden emulate Qutb's revolutionary 
ideology - a blueprint for recreating the ideal Islamic state through a process of political 
rupture with modernjahili societyJ46 However, in order to recreate the ideal Islamic state, the 
model for which is based on "the archetypal society of Medina,,,347 Qutb set for himself the 
task of legitimising revolt in terms of mainstream Sunni thought,48 According to Qutb, the 
fact that "the right to revolt ... is not readily acceptable to traditional Sunni political 
thought, ,,349 is irrelevant if one compares the similarity of the crisis Islam faces today with the 
challenges the Prophet encountered in his efforts to save Islam from being annihilated in the 
early years of the seventh century. Qutb believed that the only way "to tum back the tide of 
secularism" and force Muslim societies "to return to the values of Islam" was by creating "an 
ideology that would mobilize a dedicated vanguard" "a party of committed individuals who 
vowed to fulfill God's command and replace the jahilixvah of Mecca with a just egalitarian 
society that recognized only the sovereignty of God ,,150 
In his attempt to recreate "the original community," i.e, "that of the first community of 
believers at the time of Prophet and of the first four caliphs,,,}5 I Qutb inevitably simplified the 
life and the career of the Prophet. According to Karen Armstrong, Qutb "removed the 
complexities, ambiguities, and contradictions of the Prophet's personaL multi-faceted struggle, 
to create the kind of streamlined program that a modern ideology requires, but in the process, 
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example, "Qutb saw the Prophet's career proceeding in four stages; to recreate a rightly guided 
community in the twentieth century, Muslims must also go through this four-fold process.,,)3 
Qutb selectively interpreted the first stage of the Prophet Muhammad's career in such a way 
that Qutb would be able to legitimate his call for ~true' Muslims (the vanguard) to create a 
counter-society "a pure Muslim enclave "J54 However, although Muhammad and the first 
community of Muslims segregated themselves from pagan Meecan society, and eventually 
undertook the migration (h~jra) from Meeca to Yathrib, they did so because their lives, as well 
as the existence of the Islamic faith~ were threatened with extinction 355 Thus~ the third stage 
of the Prophet's career - the establishment of the Islamic state of Medina was not, as it is in 
the case of Qutb's ideology, a matter of voluntary exclusion and separation from mainstream 
society. The fact that "the last time Muhammad preached to the community before his death, 
he urged Muslims to use their religion to reach out to others in understanding, since all human 
beings were brothers," who were made into different nations and tribes so that they may know 
one another, is evidence that Qutb's radical fundamentalist ideology is contrary to the Koran's 
f " I" d I 3% message 0 mC.USIon an to.erance.-
Much like Mawdudi, ''who demanded a universal jihad, which he declared to be the central 
tenant of Isiam",357 Qutb insisted that the final and most important stage of the Prophet 
:\1uhammad's career was his initiation of "a period of armed struggle against Mecca, at first in 
3~3 Annstrong_ 2 .... 2. 
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small scale raids against the Meccan trading caravans. and then by sustaining the attacks of the 
Meecan army.,,35R In keeping with Qutb's thinking, Mohamed Atta, who piloted the first plane 
that crashed into the World Trade Centre. is believed to have authored the "Doomsday 
Document" which refers to the raid at Badr and the battle of Uhud in such away that they are 
taken out of context and given an active contemporary application, which emphasises the need 
for the 9/11 hijackers to wage a jihad against the United States as it is representative of pagan 
Mecca. Like Mecca was in the seventh century, the United States, the leader of the Western 
world, is economically and militarily superior to the Muslim world in the twenty-first century. 
Hence, the destruction of the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon by 19 members of Al 
Qaeda was symbolic of the way in which Mecca was eventually defeated by a small Muslim 
force.,59 
However, as Armstrong states, "by making jihad central to the Muslim vision," radical Islamic 
fundamentalists distort the life and career of the Prophet Muhammad360 According to 
traditional biographies, "even though the first ummah had to fight to survive, Muhammad did 
not achieve victory by the sword but by a creative and ingenious policy of non-violence," 
which eventually resulted in Mecca voluntarily opening its gates to Muhammad and accepting 
"the rule of Islam and the sovereignty of God.,,361 Similarly to Armstrong, Huston Smith, one 
of the world's most respected authorities on the history of religions, challenges the Western 
stereotype that views Islam as a religion that was "spread primarily by the sword ,,362 Smith 
states that although "the Koran does not counsel turning the other cheek," it does teach 
"forgiveness and the return of good for evil when the circumstances warrant - 'turn away evil 
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with that which is better (42:37).,,363 This is, however, different from "not resisting evil." 
"Far from requiring the Muslim to tum himself into a doormat for the ruthless, the Koran 
allows punishment of wanton wrongdoers to the full extent of the injury they impm1 (22:39-
49) ,,364 Social justice is thus a principle held dear to Islam, but the rules of righteous war or 
jihad do not permit the slaying of women, children or the elderly, all of who were victims of 
the 9111 suicide terrorist attacks365 
Thus, although the Koran permits the use of violence in very specific circumstances, all of 
which, according to the majority of Muslims, involve matters of self-defense, terrorism - "the 
deliberate killing of noncombatants" - is strictly forbidden in Islam 366 In addition, Rudolph 
Peters observes that '''without any exception'" "'all I modernist} authors emphatically state 
that [jihad] may never serve the aid of compelling people to conversion.' Moreover, most 
modernist scholars throughout the Islamic world emphasize that jihad does not mean only 
fighting. 'There are spiritual and moral forms of jihad \V'hich are more important than fighting 
and that the jihad duty can also be performed by the tongue and the pen. ,,,367 In other words, 
there is a distinction between the spiritual and physical forms of jihad, which "simply means 
'to exert",368 Spiritually, the meaning of jihad is interpreted as "engaging in a battle against 
sin and Satan in one's own life. This is called 'the greater jihad.' Applied to the physical 
realm, the exertion means righteous warfare. This is called 'the lesser jihad.' A weB-known 
Hadith reports that the prophet Muhammad gave top precedence to the greater jihad, 
I .," 1 I . '1 ,,369 .mmamty s spmtua strugg.e agamst evL. .. 
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4.4 A Case Study of Al Qaeda and the Ideology that Inspired the 9/11 
Suicide Terrorist Attacks 
a) AI Qaeda: A Global Multinational Terrorist Network 
It was established in chapter two that the 19 men who hijacked 4 planes on September II til 
2001 and then crashed 3 of them into the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon, belonged to 
Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda organisation, the roots of which lie in Soviet-occupied 
Afghanistan . .no 
After Soviet troops entered Kabul, Afghanistan, in 1979, bin Laden traveled to Peshawar, 
Pakistan, and started raising funds for the Afghan Mujaheddin and their cause. In] 982, bin 
Laden decided to settle in Peshawar permanently, where he joined his mentor and the head of 
the MB in that province, Abdullah Azzam. Azzam had created the Makhtab al Khidmat 
(MaK) or Services Centre, which provided accommodation and logistical services to 
thousands of Arab volunteers, who had come from all over the Muslim world to fight the 
invading communist enemy.371 The Arab Afghans, as they became known, shared many of 
bin Laden's views. which were deeply coloured by the ideas and doctrines of the MB and 
" d' A b" W hh b' I 372 au 1 "_ra la s ,a a lte c ergy. The influence of Wahhabism, which is a radical 
fundamentalist sect of Islam founded by Ibn Abd al-Wahhab in the mid-1700s and has since 
become Saudi Arabia's state religion, was greatly underestimated before it was discovered that 
15 of the 19 9111 hijackers were citizens of Saudi Arabia. Stephen Schwartz, "a journalist 
who has been studying Islam and extremism for more than a decade, set out to write an expose 
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of Wahhabism, which he believes is at the of root of 'two and a half centuries of Islamic 
fundamentalism, and ultimately terrorism, in response to global change. ",373 Schwartz 
describes how more than two centuries before Qutb denounced Egypt as ajahili society, al-
Wahhab returned from his travels of the Ottoman Empire with "a belief that Islam had been 
corrupted and weakened by the Ottomans, and that it needed to be brought back to its 
root5.,':374 However" as is the case with all radical Islamic fhndamentalist sects, al-Wahhab's 
brand of "an originaL authentic Islam" misinterpreted and distorted the word of God as 
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad.37s Similarly to Schwartz, Rashid warns that the spread of 
Wahhabism, which became "a major plank in Saudi foreign policy after the oil boom in the 
1 970 '" h" I .. h . .. f . 376 .. _ s, contmues to present t e mternatlOna commumty WIt a senous cnslS o. secunty; 
particularly because the Wahhabi model of Islam is defined solely by its absolute intolerance 
of anyone - Muslim and non-Muslim - who does not adhere to the same beliefs as it 
espouses. 377 
Osama bin Laden, who in 1986 "set up his own training camp tor Arab Afghans," which was 
funded with Saudi money, became increasingly revered as the ideal Islamic leader - someone 
who "can emulate the personality of the Prophet Muhammad,,378 and can rid Islam of all its 
impurities379 After Azzam's assassination, which many believe bin Laden was responsible 
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for,lg0 bin Laden took over Azzaro's organisation and "established a database of all the ." 
volunteers who had passed through his camps." "This gave birth to an organisational structure 
built around a computer file whose Arabic title Al Qaeda (The [Data J base) became famous 
only ten years later when it was portrayed to the American Justice Department as the key to an 
ultra-secret terrorist network.,,381 According to Rohan Gunaratna, the world's leading expert 
on the terrorist network, AI Qaeda is "above all else a secret, almost virtual, organization, one 
that denies its own existence in order to remain in the shadows. This explains why it always 
uses other names and identities (such as the World Islamic Front tor Jihad Against the Jews 
and the Crusaders) when referring to its actions, beliefs or statements, thereby keeping us 
guessing about its true motives, its true intentions. ,,382 
Besides for its policy of absolute secrecy, AI Qaeda draws its strength from the fact that "it 
confronts the world with a new kind of threat" - it is "the first (global) multinational terrorist 
group of the twenty-first century.,,3S3 <'AI Qaeda pursues its objectives through a network of 
cells," the membership of which varies from 2 to 15 individuals. 3%4 "Cells assigned for special 
missions like 9/11 ... are coordinated through an agent-handling system where a cell leader 
reports only to his controller or agent handler. Most agent handlers live near the target 
location or in the 'hostile zone' Europe or North America. Some cell leaders report to a 
principal agent handler who never leaves Afghanistan, Pakistan or another 'safe zone. ",385 
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As noted above, Al Qaeda was established and dominated by Arabs, for this reason "Arabs 
staff the vital positions and control all the key operations. ,,386 However, being truly global, Al 
Qaeda is "organized along the lines of a broad-based family clan with its constituent 
multinational members designated as 'brothers,' a term commonly used by religious Muslims 
when referring to each other.,,387 Hence, Al Qaeda's "North African 'family' (exclusively 
Algerians, Egyptians, Tunisians, Moroccans, Libyans) is responsible for activities in Europe, 
its Southeast Asian 'family' (Malaysians, Indonesians, Filipinos, Singaporeans) for operations 
in the Far East and its Central Asian 'family' for the region from Turkey across Muslim 
Central Asia into Xingjiang in China.,,388 Thus, "what gives AJ Qaeda its global reach is its 
ability to appeal to Muslims irrespective of their nationality, giving it unprecedented 
resources.,,389 Al Qaeda's multinational terrorist organisation is therefore a global threat. 
b) Al Qaeda's Radical Islamic Fundamentalist Ideology: A Motivation for Murder 
As Mustafa Alani of the Royal United Services Institute for Security and Defense Studies in 
London states, "AI-Qaeda as an ideology is now stronger than al-Qaeda as an organisation.,,39o 
It has been shown throughout this chapter that Al Qaeda's ideology is deeply rooted in the 
radical Islamic fundamentalist ideologies of its associate groups. Most notably, is the effect 
Mawdudi (the founder of the Jamaat-i-Islami) and Qutb (the principal ideologue of the ME in 
Egypt), "both of whom sanctioned the use of violence for the establishment of Islam," have 
had on Al Qaeda's leaders and members. 391 
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Although radical Islamic fundamentalists from all over the Muslim world 'fight' to be one of 
the chosen few recruited as f1.1ll Ai Qaeda members/92 in order to attract the widest possible 
support for its revolutionary cause - the elimination of apostate rulers, as well as all those who 
support repressive regimes in the Middle East and the establishment of an Islamic state that is 
governed in accordance with Shari 'a law393 - AI Qaeda "produces moral justifications for 
violent acts" that contradict mainstream traditional Islamic thought. 394 ~10st experts on terror 
agree, "people do not ordinarily engage in reprehensible conduct until they have justified to 
themselves the morality of their actions." "In this process, destructive conduct is made 
personally and socially acceptable by portraying it in the service of moral purposes. ,,395 
It is thus essential for the leaders of AI Qaeda to raise awareness among Muslims of the 
grievances that gave rise the to world's most infamous terrorist organisation. Al Qaeda 
therefore "attaches great importance to propaganda, in particular the need for Muslim youths 
to reflect on the state of their societies,,396 As with almost all radical Islamic fundamentalist 
organisations, "Al Qaeda specif1cally targets young men as recruits,,397 - men who feel that 
they are leading a life of humiliation. AI Qaeda's leaders deliberately intensity these feelings 
of humiliation and provide new recruits with "seductive solutions to grievances.,,398 The 
source of Muslim youths problems is, according to AI Qaeda, which conforms to Qutb's 
."C "According to Western intelligence sources. ",hich vary quite alarmingly in their estimates. between 
10.000 and 110.000 recruits graduated [rom Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan between 1989 and October 
200 I" Howevcr. .. Al Qacda recmited only 3.000 or 3 percent. of those it trained in tcrrorism and guerrilla 
warfare. this suggests that Al Qaeda has more than enough manpower to draw on. now and in thc future. 
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revolutionary ideology, apostate rulers who have been corrupted by Western values that have 
infiltrated into Muslim societies: 399 
'The [the apostate mlers] tried, using every means and seduction, to produce a generation 
of young men that did not know anything except what [the rulers] want did not say 
anything except what rthe rulers] want, did not say anything except what [the rulers] think 
about did not live except according to the miers' way, and did not dress except in the 
miers' clothes ... the bitter situation the nation has reached is a result of its divergence 
from Allah's course and his religious law for all places and all times'...IOi.1 
Qutb emphasised "the need to cleanse Islam from impurities resulting from its exposure to 
Western and capitalist influence.,,4ol Commentary from an AJ Qaeda recruitment video seised 
in London after September 11th stated that the only way to purify Islam, i.e., bring Islam back 
to its roots. is through the use of violence: 402 
··.Jihad. bullets and martyrdom operations are The only way to destroy The degradation 
and disbelierwhich have spread in the lvfuslim lands.,>-I03 
However, the fact that the Koran permits only a jihad of self-defense, which excludes the 
techniques of terror, means that the enemy must be dehumanised to such an extent that 
"recruits are willing to violate normal moral rules" in an effort "to restore the dignity of 
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Franz Fanon's notion that violence is a 'cleansing force,' which frees the oppressed youth 
from his 'inferiority complex,' 'despair' and 'inaction.' making him fearless and restoring his 
If. ,,405 se -respect. 
As shown in chapter one, according to the Koran, to sacrifice oneself in the defense of Islam is 
"the highest form of witness to God." 406 Acts of martyrdom are therefore given top priority 
by Al Qaeda recruits: all of whom have been ideologically indoctrinated to believe that "to 
inflict maximum damage on the enemy target by fearlessly striking it (and) in the process also 
destroying (oneself)," is "the highest form of sacrifice. ,,407 Although other terrorist 
organisations driven by radical Islamic fundamentalist ideology psychologically condition 
their recruits to be willing to die for the cause. "no other group has invested so much time and 
effort as AI Qaeda in programming its fighters for death.,,40l< The fact that the Koran explicitly 
condemns suicide is another reason why "the enemy must be portrayed as a monstrous threat" 
- one that is intent on destroying IsIam409 In order to achieve his objectives Osama bin Laden 
indoctrinates Al Qaeda's recruits to believe that those Muslims who choose to sacrifice their 
lives in the defense of Islam will be greatly rewarded in the afterlife: 410 
69. 
"A martyr's privileges are guaranteed by Allah; forgiveness with the first gush of blood, 
he will be shown his seat in paradise, he will be decorated with the jewels of Imaan 
[belief]. married off to the beautiful ones, protected from the test in the grave, assured 
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security in the day of judgment, cfO"wned with the crown of dignity, a ruby of which is 
better than Duniah [the whole world] and its entire content. wedded to seventy-two of the 
pure Houries [beautiful ones of paradise], and his intercession on behalf of seventy of his 
relatives will be accepted. ,Hll 
75 
As is shO\\/n in chapter two, at least 6 of the 19 hijackers held responsible for the 9111 suicide 
terrorist attacks had been preparing for their deaths at least 2 years before the events of 
September 11th occurred 412 Bin Laden, however, has been quoted as saying that all 19 
hijackers knew in advance that 9111 was going to be a "martyrdom operation,,413 The fact 
that not 1 of the 19 hijackers flinched or had a second thought about the act of suicide 
terrorism he was preparing to perform, is mainly attributable to his religious belief that he, as 
well as his family, would be rewarded by Allah for his supreme sacrifice. 414 
The fact that suicide bombers do not conform to "the typical profile of the suicidal 
personality,,,415 means that the leaders of Al Qaeda know full well that if "the culture of 
martyrdom" were not firmly embedded in the collective psyche of the AI Qaeda organisation, 
its recruits would not be willing to perform a terrorist operation that would be guaranteed to 
kill them. 416 In other words, AJ Qaeda recruits who have been selected for martyrdom are 
111 Gunaratna. 9 & 10. 
II' Gerald Posner. Irhl' America S'/epf: The Failure to Prevel1! 9 11 (Ne\\ York: Random House. 2(03). 1-1-7-
1-1-9. 
413 Steye Smith. "unanswered Questions'-' chA in trorhh in Collision: Terror and {he FUlure (?fGlobal 
Order. eds. Ken Booth and Tim Dunne (New York: Plagra\c Macmillan. 2(02). 51. 
111. Rohan Gunaratna. Inside AI Qaeda: Glohal Xe{Work (!fTermr (New York: The Berklcy Publishing 
Group. 2003). 9. 
11 '. l\ asra Hassan. --An Arscnal of Belieyers'-' in The Xew Yorker (19 Noyember 2001 ). 2 & 3. A \ai lable: 
1:illP:I/www.ncW\orker.com/printablel..factlOII119fa FACTI accessed on 25/08/03. The 9/ll suicide bombers. 
for c.xample. were not mentally unstable. poor or uneducated. In fact. the opposite is true: most of them came 
from middle-class families and had uniYcrsity educations. These facts also dispute the correlation often made 
between po\'crty and terrorism. Sec Karin von Hippe/. --Thc Roots of Terrorism: Probing the M!ths.-- in 
,';uperterrorism: PoliCi' Re.'ponses. cd. Lawrcnce Freedman (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing. 2002). 26, 
·;)6 Rohan Gunaratna. Inside AI Qaeda: G/obalSefll'ork (JOermr (New York Thc Berkley Publishing 











subject to intense indoctrination by the organisation's masterminds - the purpose of 
indoctrination is to accentuate the new recruit's pre-existing fundamentalist beliefs.4P 
In addition, religious indoctrination involves usmg "methods of group pressure" - these 
include placing recruits in secret martyrdom cells and bestowing on each cell member the title 
'the living martyr' (al shaheed al hC{r). 418 The living martyrs are 'encouraged' by the trainer 
to undergo countless hours of recitation, during which selected verses of the Koran are read 
repetitively. Thus, emphasising the need to \vage a violent jihad against the infidel enemy419 
As did 1 of the 9111 hijackers in "The Wills of the New York and Washington Battle 
Martyrs," soon to be suicide bombers are generally "instructed to write or videotape a final 
testimony.,,420 The act of repeatedly reading or watching his or her final will and testament 
has the effect of creating "a kind of 'social contract' that the candidate will find difficult, if not 
. 'hl b \, ,,421 lmposSL.e to reaK.. 
4.5 Conclusion 
Thus, the conclusion of this chapter is that radical Islamic fundamentalist ideology in general, 
and AI Qaeda's radical fundamentalist ideology in particular, provides the best probable 
explanation of the 9/11 suicide terrorist attacks. If the 9111 hijackers had not been 
indoctrinated with radical Islamic fundamentalist beliefs, they would not have been willing to 
sacrifice their lives in the defense of Islam. Radical Islamic fundamentalists such as Osama 
bin Laden often address genume political grievances that are of concern to all Muslims. 
II David Brooks. "The Culture of Martyrdom:· in The .-It/antic .\ fo/lfh~\' (June 2(02). 2. Available: 
I1..!!Q://wmuheatlantiq::oll1lissues/2Q02Ibrooks.htm accessed on 2311 0/02. 
m. Assaf Moghadam. ··Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Motimlions and Organizational 
Aspects:· in SllIdies il1 Conflict & Terrorism 26 (2005): 85 & 86. 
119 Nasra Hassan. "An Arsenal of Belieyers:' in The Yew rorker (19 November 20(1). 6. Ayailable: 
http://,,\\\\.ne\\yorker,com/printablel?factlO 11119fa F ACII accessed on 25/08105. 
D'. Omid Brooks. "The Culture of Martyrdom:· in the AI/antic .\lol1fh~t, (June 20(H). 3. A"ailable: 
http://myw.theatiantic.comlissues/2002Ibrooks.hlll1 accessed on 23/10/02. See chapter one for further details 
concerning "The Wills of the New York and Washington Ba,ttle Martyrs:· 
.J:J. AssafMoghadam. "Palestinian Suicide Terrorism in the Second Intifada: Moti\ations and Organizational 











However. unlike the majority of Muslims, including moderate Islamic fundamentalists. radical 
lslamic fundamentalists sanction the use of terror as a means to achieve their goals. In order 
to justifY their morally unacceptable actions, radical Islamic fundamentalists such as Qutb 
distort Islam as it was revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, offering instead their own selective 
interpretation of why Islam fell from glory and how the crisis that confronts Muslim societies 













5.1 Concluding Findings 
The concluding findings of this dissertation are that there is sufficient reliable evidence 
to prove that 19 members of Osama bin Laden's Al Qaeda terrorist organisation were 
responsible for committing acts of mass suicide terrorism, which resulted, on September 
1 ! th 2001, in the deaths of over 3000 people and the complete destruction of the World 
Trade Centre in New York. This evidence is essential to achieving the aim of the study, 
which is to show that radical Islamic fundamentalism, and more specifically Al Qaeda's 
radical Islamic fundamentalist ideology, was the most probable cause of the 9/1 1 suicide 
terrorist attacks. In addition, this evidence is vital in order to be able to debunk the myth 
that a whole civilisation of people, which although may be anti-American as a result of 
political grievances, is not an inherent threat to the West like Samuel P. Huntington 
believes it is. 
Furthermore, this dissertation found that although Huntington is correct in assuming that 
contlict will be defined by cultural, and more specifically religious, values, his 
assumption that these values encompass those held by entire populations is, however, 
false. In other words, "the dominating source of contlict will be cuItural,,,·m not in the 
civilisationaI sense, i.e., Islam versus the West, but rather in terms of the radical Islamic 
fundamentalist values adhered to by a very small minority of Muslims versus all those -
Muslim and non-Muslim - who adopt, or even compromise with, the values of Western 
modernity. It is thus reasonable to conclude that radical Islamic fundamentalism, and 
not Islam, is a threat, not just to the West, but to all those who are at peace with the 
values and principles of democracy. 
·12: Samuel P. Huntington. The Clash o{Ovilizarions and (he Remaking of World Order (London: 











5.2 Significance of the Study with Regards to Future Policy 
1m plica tions 
According to Rohan Gunaratna, "the global fight against AI Qaeda will be the defining 
conflict of the twenty-first century ".:/23 As was shown in the previous chapter, "Osama 
bin Laden has built an organization that functions both operationally and ideologically at 
local, national and international levels. Defeating Al Qaeda and its associate groups will 
be the single biggest challenge confronting the international community, law 
enforcement authorities and national militaries in the foreseeable future. ,,424 
In order for the governments of the world to be able to prevent and combat the terrorist 
threat that AI Qaeda poses to the safety of their citizens, it is essential that the 
appropriate governing authorities understand where the origins of terrorism lie. In this 
case, the roots of terror can be directly traced to the radical Islamic fundamentalist 
ideology that AI Qaeda and its associate groups espouse. Thus, the enemy is not Islam, 
as has already been discussed, but radical Islamic fundamentalism - the ideology. 
It therefore follows that understanding the nature, i.e., the key features, of radical ...... ' .. . 
Islamic fundamentalist ideology is crucial in fighting and winning the war against _... - -- :..... "-
terrorism. In other words, although "heavy bombing detected, disrupted and degraded 
the physical infrastructure of AI Qaeda and the Taliban in Mghanistan, their fighting 
cadres are intact," and will continue to grow unless governments and civil society 
respond to "the long-term strategic threat" posed by Al Qaeda's ideology 425 According 
to Gunaratna, "the powerful message that Al Qaeda is not Koranic but heretical has not 
been packed into the counterterrorism toolbox. If no effort is made to counter or dilute 
the ideology of extremism, then support for the AI Qaeda model of Islam will only 
~::'. Rohan Gunarutnu. Inside.11 Qaeda: Glohal Yetmwk o/Terror (Ncw York: The Berkley Publishing 
Group. 20(3). 29-t 
GunaratnLl. 29-+ 











increase," which means that thousands of young Muslim men will continue to be 
recmited to sacrifice their lives in acts of suicide terrorism. 426 
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